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INTRODUCTION
Traditional financial statement auditing begins with an auditor
assessing a company's internal control environment-the processes used
to promote reliability of a company's financial reporting. Relative
control effectiveness dictates the scope of substantive testing auditors
apply to financial statement assertions. Traditionally, auditing standards
did not require auditors to disclose the details of their control assessment
process or its effect on the scope of substantive testing they perform. As
a matter of law, this meant that auditors faced no liability for failure to
disclose control irregularities or their effects on financial statements. It
also meant that auditors, when giving an opinion on financial statement
assertions, are secondary actors and not liable to those defrauded
through materially misstated financial statements.
The wave of financial statement frauds of the late 199os and early
2ooos exposed the shortcomings of this traditional approach to auditing
and auditor legal liability. Congress responded by creating a new
auditing standard-setter, the Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board (PCAOB), and directing it to redefine auditing practices to
generate auditor disclosure concerning relative control effectiveness.
Under new standards, auditors must perform audits of internal control
and provide opinions for financial statement users. As a matter of law,
auditors now face liability for failure to disclose certain control
irregularities and their effects on the scope of the auditor's substantive
testing. When given such opinions on control, auditors likely become
primary actors exposed to liability when their disclosures concerning
control effectiveness are materially misstated.
The theory of this new regime is to provide financial statement users
with an early warning system. Control irregularities impair a company's
ability to provide reliable financial statements. Auditors may be able to
overcome control irregularities through expanded substantive testing and
conclude that current financial statements are fair, but those
irregularities signal a company's potential inability to provide fair
financial statements in the future. Requiring auditors to disclose control
irregularities is intended to enable financial statement users to gauge
financial statement reliability independently, rather than rely solely on
auditor judgment. This innovative approach to enhanced transparency in
the financial reporting process promises to promote the integrity of
financial statements.
Auditing's new early warning system, however, presents numerous
challenges that must be met in order for it to succeed. This Article
considers challenges arising from the interplay between the new early
warning system and related legal standards governing auditor liability. It
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demonstrates that existing legal standards, when applied to this new
system, create skewed liability incentives for auditors when determining
whether certain control irregularities should be disclosed.
In particular, while Section i i of the Securities Act of 1933
encourages auditors to treat close questions of control irregularity as
requiring disclosure, Section Io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 encourages auditors to treat close questions as not requiring
disclosure, thereby impairing the early warning system. Section io(b)
applies to a broader range of circumstances than Section i i, so its effects
are stronger than those of Section i i. As a result, existing legal standards
tend to impair the promise of the early warning system.
To meet this challenge, this Article suggests developing safe harbors
for auditor disclosure of early warnings concerning potential effects of
control weaknesses on future financial statement reliability.
Part I provides a comprehensive examination of auditing's new early
warning system. It presents the framework for the new exercise of
control audits, describes the triggers requiring auditors to disclose
information concerning control effectiveness, and interprets new
standards defining the content of this disclosure. Particular attention is
paid to a key distinction in this system between control irregularities
constituting significant deficiencies, which auditors need not disclose, and
those constituting material weaknesses, which auditors must disclose and
explain. Special attention also focuses on the content auditors must
provide when disclosing material weaknesses, particularly as to (1) the
actual effects of material weaknesses on the auditor's substantive testing
of financial statement assertions, and (2) the potential effects of material
weaknesses on future financial statements.
Part II examines the interplay between these new auditing standards
and pre-existing legal standards governing auditor liability. It explains
that the new auditing standards expressly nullify case law under Section
i i that formerly shielded auditors from liability for failure to disclose
material weaknesses and their consequences. The combined effect of the
new auditing standards and existing Section ii jurisprudence is to
encourage auditors to characterize uncertain control irregularities as
material weaknesses rather than significant deficiencies. Auditors thus
disclose them and promote the early warning system's objectives.
This Part then considers how the new auditing standards may nullify
case law under Section Io(b) that distinguishes between primary actors
who face liability and secondary actors who do not. Auditors providing
disclosure under the new auditing standards likely become primary
rather than secondary actors, while those who do not remain secondary
actors. The combined effect of the new auditing standards and existing
Section io(b) jurisprudence is to encourage auditors to characterize
uncertain control irregularities as significant deficiencies rather than
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material weaknesses. Auditors thus do not disclose them and thwart the
early warning system's objectives.
This discussion then shows how using safe harbors for auditor
disclosure concerning the potential effects of material weaknesses on
future financial statements is probably necessary to achieve the early
warning system's objectives. Safe harbors will encourage auditors to err
on the side of characterizing uncertain control irregularities as material
weaknesses. Auditors will therefore provide detailed disclosure to
explain the import of these weaknesses rather than treat them as
significant deficiencies permitting nondisclosure.
Part III adopts a broader perspective on auditing's new early
warning system. While applauding the system's goals and main features,
it also expresses concern that the system reflects a misguided
preoccupation with internal control as the key to producing reliable
financial reporting. It illustrates numerous situations in which control can
be effective but financial misstatements still occur. The early warning
system may be useful to flag risks of future financial misstatements due
to weak control, but the new auditing standards pay insufficient attention
to-and may even obscure-the possibility that effective control may be
inadequate to assure financial statement reliability.
I. PCAOB's EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requires a company's management
to assess the effectiveness of its internal control over financial reporting'
and publicly disclose its conclusions In turn, SOX requires auditors to
attest to these managerial assertions and report their conclusions
publicly.' SOX directs the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB) to establish auditing standards for this exercise.4 PCAOB did
so in Auditing Standard No. 2.'
i. For convenience, the phrase "internal control over financial reporting" is often abbreviated in
this Article as "control." This clunky phrase emerged during SEC regulatory development as a way to
distinguish this type of control from a wide variety of internal controls corporations use to achieve
various objectives. Closely related to internal control over financial reporting (in this technical sense)
are controls the SEC dubs "disclosure controls and procedures." The latter term is intended to define
a somewhat overlapping variety of mechanisms that may be beyond the scope of an auditor's testing,
evaluation, and opinion. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, MANAGEMENT'S REPORTS ON
INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING AND CERTIFICATION OF DISCLOSURE IN EXCHANGE ACT
PERIODIC REPORTS, RELEASE NO. 33-8238 (June 5, 2003) [hereinafter SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON
CONTROL].
2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 404(a),15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (Supp. 2002); see SEC,
MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note I.
3. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,, § 404(b).
4- § io3(a)(2)(A) (calling for auditor opinion on control effectiveness); § 404(b) (calling for
auditor opinion on management's assertions concerning control effectiveness).
5. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS (Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) March 9, 2004) [hereinafter AUDITING STANDARD No. 2].
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A. FRAMEWORK
In promulgating Auditing Standard No. 2, PCAOB made several
major decisions reflecting an ambitious vision for its new audit system for
internal control over financial reporting. They add up to this: the
auditor's engagement is a full-fledged audit of control, requiring the
auditor's opinion specifically on control effectiveness, with any material
weakness compelling the auditor to issue an adverse opinion.6
This model's strength can be seen by considering its alternative,
which PCAOB rejected: the engagement could have been a review of
control, calling for the auditor's opinion only on managerial assertions
concerning control effectiveness, with material weaknesses calling for the
auditor to determine whether to issue an adverse opinion or various
forms of qualified opinions. The following explains each choice, showing
that Auditing Standard No. 2 is strong brew, not weak tea.
i. Audit of Control
Auditing Standard No. 2 denominates the auditing engagement
concerning control as an audit, not merely a review or other limited
exercise. PCAOB solicited public comment as to whether the
engagement should be denominated as an audit. Numerous
commentators opined that it would be more accurate to describe it as an
attestation exercise, suggesting lower levels of work and assurance.7
6. Id. app. H 59, 140. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2'S definition of material weakness is excerpted
infra note 15.
7. E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from: Prof. McAllister, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No.
8, Letter No. 36 (2003) (describing the audit designation as potentially problematic and confusing);
Arnall Golden Gregory, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 57 (2003) (review of internal
control concerns risk of future financial misstatements, entailing lower level of assurance compared to
financial statement audit); Texas Society of Certified Public Accountants, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 78 (2003) (audit involves testing whereas an attestation involves review);
F6ddration des Experts Comptables Europ6ens, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 79
(2o03) (noting inconsistency with international standards that distinguish between assurance and
audit); Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 102 (2o03) (opining that SOX Section 4o4(b) refers to an attestation or report, so
denominating it an audit goes beyond mandate and "substantially alter[s] the risk profile of the audit
profession"); Cummins, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 123 (2003) ("intent should be
to validate the adequacy of management's process and not to re-perform the assessment"); Caterpillar
Corp., PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 143 (2003) (contending that denominating the
exercise as an audit exceeds SOX's mandate).
Other commentators supported denominating the exercise as an audit, including the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), the Big Four auditing firms, and some
mid-sized auditing firms. See Comment Letters to PCAOB from: American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 1O5 (2oo3); Deloitte & Touche
LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71 (2oo3); Ernst & Young LLP, PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144 (2003); KPMG LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 91 (2003); PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No.
82 (2003); BDO Seidman, LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136 (2003); Grant
Thornton LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. ioi (2003); McGladrey & Pullen, LLP,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 142 (2003).
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PCAOB opined that the concepts of audit and attestation describe
engagements of equivalent scope. Despite acknowledging that many
treat the concepts as involving different levels of work and assurance,
PCAOB emphasized the technical equivalence of these exercises.8 Even
so, PCAOB defended its choice to call the engagement an audit on the
ground that attestation is insufficient to describe the elaborate exercise
Auditing Standard No. 2 prescribes.9
2. Direct Opinion on Control
Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to deliver two control-
related opinions: one opinion on management's assertions concerning
control effectiveness and a separate opinion on the auditor's own
assessment of whether a company maintained effective internal control
over financial reporting."0 The separate opinion on control involves
auditors more directly in the disclosure process. That is, if their opinion
concerned only management's assertions, auditors could concur or
dissent, forcing all detailed disclosure obligations on management. By
requiring a separate direct opinion, auditors cannot hide behind
management's statements. They must provide their own disclosure.
PCAOB made this decision based on comments it received on the
proposed standard. It asked whether the audit report should speak
directly to control rather than merely to management's assertions." Its
original model proposed an auditor opinion on management's assertions
when they were unqualified, and a direct opinion when not unqualified.
Auditing Standard No. 2 instead adopts the two-opinion approach in all
circumstances, which PCAOB explained is necessary to provide greater
clarity of disclosure to investors and to avoid confusion. PCAOB also
opined that this approach is more consistent with SOX Sections 404 and
8. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. I i9 ("There is no difference in the level of
work performed or assurance obtained by the auditor when expressing an opinion on management's
assessment of effectiveness or when expressing an opinion directly on the effectiveness of internal
control over financial reporting."); see also Press Release, PCAOB, An Audit of Internal Control
Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements 7 (March
9, 2004) [hereinafter PCAOB Press Release] (explaining that it is "erroneous" to distinguish between
attestation and audit; both require the same level of work).
9. PCAOB Press Release, supra note 8, at 6. Even PCAOB, therefore, implicitly recognizes
some differences in engagements described as audits versus attestations, and clearly emphasizes that
the new regime involves a complete rather than partial evaluation.
Io. AUDmNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 1 167. The two opinions can be presented in a
single report or in separate reports. Id.
II. PROPOSED AUDIING STANDARD: AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CoNTROL OVER FINANCIAL REPORTING
PERFORMED IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, at Question 27 (Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) Oct. 7, 2003) [hereinafter PCAOB, PROPOSED
STANDARD].
12. See AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. E 91 E27-E28 (responding that proposed
standard makes reports easier for users to understand); PCAOB Press Release, supra note 8, at 22-23
(stating that opinions on management's control assessment and on control effectiveness "most clearly
communicate[s] ... the nature and results of the work").
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103, which call for auditor opinions on both management's assertions and
control. 3
The result is that auditors now provide a total of three opinions: one
opinion on financial statements and two opinions concerning control. 4
The three-opinion arrangement poses the possibility of many different
combinations of opinions. These include the polar cases of unqualified
opinions or adverse opinions on all, as well as various combinations of
adverse and qualified opinions, plus opinions bearing scope limitations or
stating disclaimers of opinion.
3. No Qualified Opinion Option
The key concept in evaluating the effectiveness of internal control
over financial reporting is material weakness. PCAOB defines this as
control deficiencies resulting in a more-than-remote likelihood of
material misstatements in financial reports. 5 Under Auditing Standard
No. 2, the presence of a material weakness requires auditors to deliver an
adverse control opinion, without the option of providing a qualified
("except for") opinion.'6 In traditional financial-statement auditing,
"except for" opinions are used to convey an intermediate level of
assurance. I
An interpretive issue arose in the financial reporting community as
13. See PCAOB Press Release, supra note 8, at 22-23 (requiring auditor opinions on
management's control assessment and on control effectiveness most closely tracks requirements of
SOX Sections 103 and 404). The argument runs as follows: SOX Section 404 requires management's
assessment of control with an auditor attestation; Section IO3 directs PCAOB to adopt standards
requiring auditors to report on management's Section 4o4 assertions and to present their findings and
evaluation of controls.
14. PCAOB's multiple-opinion decision appears inspired, at least in part, by a comment letter
from the German auditing profession. See Comment Letter to PCAOB from Institut der
Wirtschaftspruifer, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 63 (2oo3) (opining that SOX
requires three opinions: one on financial statements, one on management's control assessment, and
one directly on control). The theoretical basis for much of the IDW's comment letter is from a FEE
publication: PRINCIPLES OF ASSURANCE: FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL ISSUES WITH RESPECT To
ASSURANCE IN ASSURANCE ENGAGEMENTs, largely the work of the IDW and can be downloaded from
FEE at http://www.fee.be.
15. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2 defines material weakness as follows:
A material weakness is a significant deficiency, or combination of significant deficiencies,
that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected.
AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. $ to. In turn, AUDITING STANDARD No. 2 defines
significant deficiency as follows:
A significant deficiency is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that
adversely affects the company's ability to initiate, authorize, record, process or report
external financial data reliably in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles
such that there is more than a remote likelihood that a misstatement of the company's
annual or interim financial statements that is more than inconsequential will not be
prevented or detected.
Id. $ 9.
16. Id. I1 173(b), 175.
17. See VINCENT M. O'REILLY ET AL., MONTGOMERY'S AUDITING 28-23 (12th ed. 1998).
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to whether management's assessments of internal control effectiveness
must be adverse when controls are ineffective in any way, or whether
management could give a qualified assessment indicating that control is
effective "except for" designated disclosed areas. SEC regulations
prescribing requirements for management's assertions about control
effectiveness prohibit management from concluding control is effective
when a material weakness exists. 8 Some commentators interpreted this
to permit management to give a qualified opinion."
PCAOB rejected this interpretation and required the audit model to
follow suit.2 Accordingly, when a material weakness is identified,
auditors must give an adverse opinion on control effectiveness.2 '
Auditing Standard No. 2 thus departs from traditional financial
18. See SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note i.
i9. Most commentators on PCAOB's proposed standard opined that its control-audit model
should follow the SEC's model for management's control assessment. Commentators split in
interpreting the SEC's management model. The SEC directs that identified material weaknesses
prevent management from concluding that control is effective. The issue is whether management can
offer a qualified opinion. Support for this view appeared in the SEC's approving citation to AT § 501,
which permits qualified opinions. See SEC, MANAGEMENT REPORTS ON CONTROL, supra note I, Pt.
II.B. 3 , n.72 (approvingly citing AT § 501 I 37); see e.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from:
Association of the Bar of the City of New York, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68
(2003) (recommending that management should disclose the nature of weaknesses and corrective
actions taken, but auditors should use judgment concerning what opinion to give); National State
Auditors Association, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 113 (2003) (agreeing that the
audit model should follow the management model and concluding that since management cannot give
qualified conclusions, neither can auditors); American Society of Corporate Secretaries, PCAOB Sub-
Committee of the ASCS Securities Law Committee, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No.
lo6 (2003) (recommending allowing auditors to use professional judgment as to whether control
opinions should be qualified rather than adverse based on materiality of weakness and any scope
limitations); American Bar Association, Section of Business Law, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 185 (2003) (stating that the qualified opinion "can be useful to convey information to
stockholders that would otherwise not be conveyed by a blanket adverse opinion").
The Big Four and mid-sized accounting firms offered split opinions. Opponents of mandatory
adverse opinions included Deloitte & Touche, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, BDO
Seidman and McGladrey & Pullen. See Comment Letters to PCAOB from: Deloitte & Touche LLP,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71 (2003); Ernst & Young LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144 (2003); PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket
No. 8, Letter No. 82 (2003); BDO Seidman, LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 136
(2003); McGladrey & Pullen, LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 142 (2003).
Supporting mandatory adverse opinions were KPMG and Grant Thornton. See Comment Letters to
PCOAB from: KPMG LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 91 (2003); Grant
Thornton LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. ioi (2003). Some others supported the
mandatory adverse opinion as well. E.g., American Accounting Association, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 31 (2003); National State Auditors Association, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. I13 (2003).
20. See AuDrnNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. E 1I EIo8-Ei14 (noting that PCAOB's
rejection of this interpretation is based on conversations with SEC staff concerning its interpretation
of SEC regulations governing management's conclusions).
2i. See id. An exception applies for circumstances where an overall opinion cannot be expressed
due to scope limitations, but then AUDmNO STANDARD No. 2 requires the auditor to explain why.
PCAOB Press Release, supra note 8, at 22 n.4 (citing SEC Regulation S-X, Item 2-02(f), that if auditor
cannot provide overall attestation opinion, auditor must explain why).
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statement auditing conventions by prohibiting the intermediate level of
assurance signaled by "except for" opinions.2
The effect of PCAOB's framework established by Auditing
Standard No. 2-requiring full control audits with direct control opinions
and no qualified opinion option-is to render auditors as detectors of
control weaknesses in the fullest possible way. This ambitious and rigid
framework is designed to generate warnings to financial statement users
concerning the reliability of financial statements prepared by companies
possessing "leaky" internal control over financial reporting. This early
warning system is at the heart of Auditing Standard No. 2, which
contains specific triggers requiring auditors to provide such warnings.
B. TRIGGERS
Auditing Standard No. 2 states: "[i]nformation on internal control
over financial reporting is... intended to provide an early warning to
those inside and outside the company who are in a position to insist on
improvements."23 Those outside the company include investors as well as
all securities professionals who participate in the financial reporting
process of public companies. 4 The information is designed to enable
these groups to apply pressure to improve control. They will be
positioned to exert this pressure to the extent that the early warning
system provides a systematic signal indicating risks of unreliability of a
company's financial statements.
i. Reports Requiring Auditor Disclosure
When auditors concur with management's assessment that control is
effective and opine separately that the company maintained effective
control, Auditing Standard No. 2 does not require auditors to provide
any additional description. 5 However, Auditing Standard No. 2
specifically requires auditors to issue modified reports containing
tailored disclosure in numerous circumstances, including the following.
First, auditors must issue an adverse report on control when a
material weakness is identified. Audit reports must state PCAOB's
definition of material weakness (a more-than-remote risk of material
financial misstatements2 6 and identify its existence. More importantly,
the auditor's report must describe the material weakness and provide
"specific information about [its] nature" and "its actual and potential
effect on the presentation of the company's financial statements issued
22. E.g., O'REILLY ET AL., supra note 17, at I8-23.
23. AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 5, app. 6.
24. Securities professionals include "accountants, public accounting firms, investment bankers,
investment advisors, brokers, dealers, attorneys, and other[s]." Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,, Pub. L.
No. 107-204 § 703, ii6 STAT. 745, 798 (2002).
25. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. at A-92, Example A-I.
26. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2's definition of material weakness is excerpted supra note 15.
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during [its] existence."27
Second, auditors must issue modified reports when "management's
assessment is inadequate."' "B In such cases, the audit report must indicate
a scope limitation indicating the lack of adequate review. 9 In addition,
auditors must issue modified reports when "management's report is
inappropriate."'3 In these cases, auditors must "include, at a minimum, an
explanatory paragraph describing the reasons for their conclusion."'"
Third, modifications to auditors' control reports are necessary when
material weaknesses exist that nevertheless do not prevent giving an
unqualified opinion on financial statements.32 A control opinion "might
describe a material weakness ... while the audit report on the financial
statements remains unqualified."33 If so, control reports are to include, in
the paragraph describing material weaknesses, language to the effect that
the auditor considered the material weaknesses in planning substantive
audit tests of financial statement assertions and that the adverse control
report did not affect the financial statement audit report.'
Auditing Standard No. 2 explains: "such disclosure is important to
ensure that users of the auditor's report on the financial statements
understand why the auditor issued an unqualified opinion on those
statements."35 In addition, "[d]isclosure is also important when the
auditor's opinion on the financial statements is affected by the adverse
opinion on the effectiveness of internal control over financial
reporting." 6 In that case, Auditing Standard No. 2 directs the auditor's
control report to include similar language but without the statement that
the adverse control report did not affect the financial statement audit
27. AUDmNG STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 5, app. 1 176 (emphasis added). This description is also
to address requirements described in 1 194, noted in the ensuing text. Id. 91 194. The standard nods at
the ridiculous in the following additional requirement: if management makes an adverse assessment of
its internal control over financial reporting (and, implicitly, the auditor concurs), then auditors would
provide an unqualified opinion as to management's assessment. Id. $ 176. Absent some additional
auditor role, when management says its company did not maintain effective internal control over
financial reporting, users do not need an auditor to attest to this assertion. Including this requirement
only makes sense if the auditor is directly charged with explaining the weakness and providing detailed
descriptions as to its actual and potential effect on the financial statements. This appears to be
PCAOB's intention. See infra Part I.C.
28. AUDMNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. I 173(a).
29. Id. 9 174.
30. Id. 91 73(a).
31. Id. 9 174. If there is material weakness, management may not conclude control is effective
and must disclose all material weaknesses. Although management's report can take many forms, it
must "state a direct conclusion about whether the company's... control ... is effective." Id. 9 163. An
auditor's evaluation of management's report must include an assessment of whether it properly
discloses material weaknesses (including those corrected during the period covered). Id. 1 i66 (e).
32. Id. 9 193.
33. Id.
34- Id. 1 194.
35. Id. 91 195.
36. Id. 1 196.
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report.37
These triggers requiring auditors to provide disclosure concerning
internal control effectiveness reflect the theory that effective internal
control is an important element in assuring reliable financial statements.
Control weaknesses threaten a company's ability to produce reliable
financial statements. Investors need to know this, even when a
company's current financial statements are deemed reliable. The
auditor's audit and opinions, including mandatory adverse opinions when
material weaknesses in control exist, are designed to communicate
warnings to financial statement users.
2. Incongruent Opinions
An auditor may issue an adverse opinion on control effectiveness
while also providing an unqualified opinion that the financial statements
fairly present financial condition and results in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP).39 This apparent incongruity is
possible because a material weakness discovered in control can be
overcome in a financial statement audit by substantive tests that do not
rely upon the controls bearing the material weakness.
The possibility of such incongruent opinions is a central element of
PCAOB's new early warning system. It is designed to enhance the
transparency of financial reporting, control, and audit processes. This is
reflected in PCAOB's response to public comment as to whether there
are "circumstances where a qualified 'except for' conclusion [in a control
audit] would be appropriate" as an alternative to expressing an adverse
37. Id.
38. Id. 1 176. Several other circumstances also require modified opinions that communicate
warnings to financial statement users. Auditors must issue a modified report to disclose any
restrictions on the engagement's scope. Id. 1 173(c). In this case, auditors can only give unqualified
opinions on management's assessment and on internal control over financial reporting if they were
able to apply all necessary procedures. Id. 1 178. Otherwise, auditors should withdraw from the
engagement, disclaim giving any opinion, or provide a qualified opinion. The choice depends on the
importance of the omitted procedures, but if restrictions are management-imposed then either
withdrawing or disclaiming both opinions is required. For example, suppose management found
control weaknesses and corrected them in a way it believes rendered control effective, but the auditor
disagrees that enough time has elapsed for the correction to be effective. This would warrant a scope
limitation. Id. 1 179. If, in this context, the auditor's partial procedures identified a material weakness,
then the auditor must provide disclosure along the lines discussed in the foregoing text.
Auditors also must issue modified reports when management includes certain disclosure in its
report in addition to its conclusions on whether control is effective. Id. 1 173 (f). Examples include
information concerning corrective actions, plans to implement new controls, and cost-benefit decisions
not to do so. Id. 1 I9o. In this case, auditors must disclaim giving an opinion on the additional
information, Id. $1 191, and, if it contains material misstatements of fact, discuss this with management,
possibly report it to the company's audit committee, and perhaps even consult its own counsel
concerning further obligations the auditor may have under Section IoA of the Securities Exchange
Act. Id. 1 192. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2 notes that if management includes such information
elsewhere in its securities filing, then no disclaimer is required though the same steps apply. Id.
39. Id. 9191 193-96.
June 2004]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
control-audit opinion when a material weakness exists. 40 Commentators
suggested numerous possible circumstances.
The most common suggestion was to permit qualified control
opinions when a material weakness in control did not prevent giving an
unqualified opinion on financial statements." Some commentators
recommended that this should apply when there are no errors or
irregularities in the financial statements, and the material weakness in
control is otherwise isolated.42 PCAOB rejected these suggestions on the
theory that control audits are designed to provide assurance of the
system's capacity to prevent future financial misstatements. Creating an
exception for circumstances where current financial statements are
unaffected would diminish the effectiveness of the early warning
system.43
3. Material Weaknesses
The automatic triggering standards hinge on an auditor's
determination of whether a control irregularity amounts to a material
weakness or a significant deficiency." A material weakness in control is a
particularly severe form of significant deficiency. The difference between
the two depends on the gravity of the control irregularity: significant
deficiencies pose consequential risks for financial statement reliability
while material weaknesses pose material risks. This characterization has
significant implications: auditors must disclose and explain material
weaknesses publicly but need only bring significant deficiencies to the
attention of management and audit committees.45
Distinguishing significant deficiencies from material weaknesses
requires judgment. Whether a particular control irregularity is a
significant deficiency or a material weakness depends on the possibility
40. PCAOB, PROPOSED STANDARD, supra note II, Question 26.
41. E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from: Credit Suisse, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 74 (2003) (suggesting except-for opinion "especially in the absence of material
misstatements to the financial statements"); Southern Union, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 98 (2003) (suggesting adverse opinion only if material weakness "could impact financials").
42. E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Arnall Golden Gregory, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 57 (2003) (suggesting allowing qualified opinions when material weaknesses
are isolated and "no errors or irregularities" appear in the financial statements).
43. In fact, PCAOB's rejection of these comments suggests that either material weaknesses in
control always prevent giving an unqualified financial statement opinion in future periods, or that
investors rather than auditors should judge the risk of this eventuality. That is, AUDImNG STANDARD
No. 2 designs an early warning system intended to empower "those inside and outside the company
who are in a position to insist on improvements in internal control over financial reporting." AUDITING
STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 6. See infra Part III.
44. AUDrnNO STANDARD No. 2's definitions of "material weakness" and "significant deficiency"
are provided in footnote 15, supra.
45. Compare AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. If 207-14 (requiring communications
to management, audit committees and boards of directors to include all significant deficiencies and
material weaknesses) with id. 173(a), 175-77 (requiring modifications to audit reports only when
there is a material weakness).
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that a financial misstatement could result (not on whether it has-this is
the essence of an early warning system).46 This determination depends on
both the likelihood and magnitude of the potential misstatement.47
Auditing Standard No. 2 defines "material weakness" in general
terms. This broad definition captures a wide range of circumstances,
from inadequate articulation of company policy to noncompliance with
it. A material weakness can involve a serious infection at a single
business segment or a significant company-wide account. Weaknesses
can result from changes in applicable GAAP or associated accounting
policies, or from acquisitions of companies that suffer from irregularities
in internal control over financial reporting.48
Furthermore, a company can be in various stages of addressing a
material weakness. A weakness can be discovered through a variety of
sources, including an internal audit or during an external audit. Curative
steps may operate effectively within a short period of time (e.g.,
dismissing a rogue noncompliant employee) or may take multiple
accounting periods (e.g., retraining the entire finance or accounting
department in proper accounting or control practices).
Auditing Standard No. 2 thus contemplates a wide variety of
circumstances requiring auditors to provide explanatory paragraphs in
reports. While PCAOB suggests disclosure parameters and provides
some specific disclosure requirements, its specific prescriptions include
ambiguities and its general directives are deliberately left open-ended as
to exactly what disclosure auditors must provide in various circumstances
as warnings to financial statement users.
C. CONTENT
Required auditor disclosure can be divided into two categories. The
first concerns the level of detail auditors must provide to explain their
conclusions. This relates primarily to the auditor's explanations
concerning identified material weaknesses and their effects on financial
statements, as well as why they regard management's assertions as
inadequate or inappropriate. The second concerns the scope of
disclosure auditors must provide to explain the effects of their
conclusions regarding control on their overall work. This relates to how
discovered material weaknesses in control influenced the scope of the
auditor's substantive testing during the financial statement audit.
46. Id. 132 ("The significance of a deficiency in... control... depends on the potential for a
misstatement, not on whether a misstatement actually has occurred.").
47. See id. T 133 (illustrating factors affecting the likelihood that a deficiency "could result in a
misstatement"); Id. 1 135 (illustrating factors affecting magnitude).
48. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2 expressly recognizes a scope limitation when material weaknesses
arise from year-end acquisitions. This scope limitation is also available generally for limitations
beyond management's capacity to address. See supra note 38.
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I. Auditor Conclusions
Auditing Standard No. 2 is clear about what auditors must do when
facing material weaknesses. They must give an adverse opinion on
control, identify the weakness, and provide Auditing Standard No. 2's
definition of material weakness. It is less clear exactly what auditors must
explain about the consequences of these material weaknesses.
Auditing Standard No. 2 expressly requires auditors to disclose
"specific information about the nature of any material weakness, and its
actual and potential effect on the presentation of the company's financial
statements issued during the existence of the weakness."'49 This is an
extraordinary statement, requiring auditors to provide forward-looking
information concerning potential effects of control weaknesses on future
financial statements.
On the other hand, PCAOB provides a seemingly different
prescription for disclosure in the auditor opinion forms accompanying
Auditing Standard No. 2. In giving an adverse opinion on control
effectiveness, these forms direct auditors to "[i]nclude a description of
the material weakness and its effect on the achievement of the objectives
of the control criteria."5 The auditor's conclusion must indicate that
"because of the effect of the material weakness ... on the achievement of
the objectives of the control criteria, [the company] has not maintained
effective internal control over financial reporting."'"
It is possible to reconcile these seemingly different propositions of
disclosure concerning actual or potential financial statement effects on
the one hand, and control objective effects on the other. Control
objectives are closely related to effects on financial statements. When
Auditing Standard No. 2 directs auditors to disclose specific information
concerning actual and potential effects of control weaknesses on
financial statements, this can be seen as the equivalent of requiring a
description of the effects of the weaknesses on control objectives.
While this reconciliation seems reasonable, the two different
prescriptions create an ambiguity. Clarifying it will require auditors to
provide detailed disclosure as to how the two propositions relate to each
other. Summary or boilerplate statements will not provide the requisite
information to financial statement users.
In addition, PCAOB's general framework for Auditing Standard
No. 2 seems to contemplate extensive auditor disclosure. Detailed
49. AUDrTNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 176 (emphasis added). This description
addresses requirements described in AUDMNG STANDARD No. 2, app. 194.
50. Id. at app. A-96, Example A-2.
51. Id. at app. A-97, Example A-2. PCAOB's examples further instruct auditors to state that this
weakness was considered in planning the financial statement audit and to state whether it affected the
resulting financial statement opinion. If it did, then PCAOB's examples refer to the requirements of
AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, app. 1 194-96, discussed in Part I.B.i, supra.
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auditor disclosure is implied by denominating the exercise an audit,
requiring separate auditor opinions directly on control, and most
importantly, mandating adverse opinions when facing material
weaknesses.
First, although PCAOB denies any particular significance to
denominating Auditing Standard No. 2's control exercise as an audit
rather than an attestation, a subtle but important consequence of the
audit conception is the designation of the control audit as an exercise of
equivalent significance to the financial statement audit. This gives control
equal stature with financial statements. Historical experience with
traditional financial statement auditing suggests that making this audit
exercise understandable to investors will require education by elaborate
disclosure."
Second, requiring separate auditor opinions on control effectiveness
creates a need for greater disclosure. This is particularly so given the
multiple combinations of the three audit opinions that are possible. To
avoid investor confusion, auditors will have to provide substantial
explanatory disclosure. This would certainly be the case when different
sorts of opinions are given, whenever an adverse or other non-standard
opinion is given, and even when all three opinions are unqualified.
Otherwise, investors may be misled concerning the relationship between
effective internal control and reliable financial statements.53
Third, and most importantly, mandating adverse opinions when
facing material weaknesses deprives auditors of a standardized signal
indicating gradations in severity. Permitting qualified opinions with
accompanying explanation is the general approach in traditional financial
statement audits. In the case of control audits, PCAOB could have
defined in Auditing Standard No. 2 a separate category for material
weaknesses that are not pervasive and prescribed the issuance of
qualified opinions in those circumstances. Absent a qualified-opinion
option, however, the communication otherwise signaled must be
52. To take a single striking example, between 1932 and 1934, the American Institute of Accounts
(successor to the American Association of Public Accountants founded in 1887 and predecessor to the
AICPA founded in 1957) engaged in wide-ranging discussion with the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) concerning the auditing profession's responsibilities. They considered whether a disclaimer in
the standard audit report stating that auditors do not perform a comprehensive examination would
help the public understand the nature of the audit process; the general consensus was that such a
statement probably would not mean much. See GARY JOHN Pltvrrs & BARBARA DuBIs MERINO, A
HISTORY OF AccoUNTANCY IN THE UNITED STATES: THE CULTURAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ACCOUNTING (1998).
By the late I98OS, this consensus changed. Studies indicated widespread public misapprehension about
auditing. As a result, the standard audit report was changed effective in 1989, adding specific sentences to
clarify that financial statement audits involve examination, on a test basis, and that financial statements
are prepared by and are the responsibility of management. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM,
INTRODUCrORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING FOR LAWYERS (4th ed. 2004).
53. This point is elaborated more fully in Part III, infra.
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provided by narrative. 4
In traditional financial statement audits, adverse opinions are a
significant penalty.5 Taken at face value, adverse control opinions can
produce consequences disproportionate to the significance of any given
material weakness. At an extreme, it can shut off a company's access to
capital. Of course, some material weaknesses justify that result. To the
extent that this result is unjustified in a particular case, it indicates a need
for detailed specificity in auditor disclosure.
Adverse opinions that reasonable investors would understand to
justify a severe reaction (e.g., withholding capital investment) would be
misleading without specific details indicating whether the defects are
pervasive. Some commentators on PCAOB's proposed standard
opposed the use of qualified opinions on the grounds that allowing them
would require auditors to evaluate the severity of material weaknesses,
leading to more classifications. 7 This result is exactly what Auditing
Standard No. 2 contemplates, but with the classifications defined by
particular auditor disclosure, not abstract categories.
Detailed disclosure is also necessary to avoid the potential dilutive
effects caused by mandatory adverse opinions. The more adverse
opinions are issued, the less information content any particular adverse
opinion carries." To make these reports meaningful and not misleading,
auditors will have to provide particularized disclosure explaining the
specific consequences of each material weakness.
PCAOB signaled its intention to require explanations by concluding
that its approach to control reporting by auditors must follow the SEC's
54. See Comment Letters to PCAOB from: Deloitte & Touche LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 71 (2oo3) (opining that mandatory adverse opinions for material weaknesses
are inappropriate if the weaknesses are "not pervasive"); PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 82 (2003) (opining that mandatory adverse opinions for
material weaknesses are "too restrictive" and inappropriate if the weakness present an "isolated
impact" as opposed to a pervasive impact).
55. E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68 (2oo3).
56. E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 1o5 (2003).
57. Comment Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8,
Letter No. 136 (2oo3).
58. E.g., id. ("[E]xcessive use of the adverse opinion.., will lessen the potential message ....
[The] adverse opinion[ ] should provide a signal of the magnitude of a pervasive weakness .... ).
59. E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from: PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, PCAOB
Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 82 (2oo3) ("Except for" opinions would "provide more useful
information to readers"); Ernst & Young LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 144
(2oo3) (supporting qualified opinion option based on assessment of material weakness that "would
more clearly communicate to users" and be more meaningful to investors); Edison Electric Institute,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 117 (2003) (supporting option to offer qualified
opinions as more useful for investors and that automatic adverse opinions would "create confusion"
and "be misleading to investors" because they do "not provide the ability to adequately communicate
to the investing public the actual impact of the weakness to the company").
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approach to control reporting by management. 6° There is no compelling
reason why the audit approach must follow the management approach.
In fact, an important difference between the two is that while
management cannot give a qualified opinion and explanation in its
control report, it can do so elsewhere in its disclosure filings, such as the
management's discussion and analysis (MD&A) section. Auditors lack
such alternative outlets. Thus, under Auditing Standard No. 2, PCAOB
requires this disclosure in the control-audit reports.
2. Auditor Processes
As explained above in the discussion of incongruent opinions,
Auditing Standard No. 2 notes that an auditor's control opinion "might
describe a material weakness... while the audit report on the financial
statements remains unqualified.' If so, Auditing Standard No. 2
requires reports to include, in the paragraph describing material
weaknesses, language indicating that the auditor considered the material
weakness in planning substantive financial audit tests and that the
adverse control report did not affect its financial statement audit report.62
It is doubtful whether such a simple statement will provide financial
statement users with sufficient information to satisfy the auditors'
obligation to provide non-misleading disclosure. Auditing Standard No. 2
does not appear to require disclosure of the auditor's processes or
assessments during the control audit (or the financial statement audit).
But since the value of providing an adverse control opinion despite an
unqualified financial statement opinion is alerting investors to the risk of
future financial statement unreliability, logic and completeness suggest
that the auditor should fully disclose such risks and related processes and
assessments.
63
The reason this incongruent opinion is possible, after all, is that
weak control discovered in a control audit can be compensated for by
substantive testing in the financial statement audit. Auditors will need to
explain this process in some detail so investors can understand it.
Investors need auditors to explain why, if current financial statement
reliability can be vouched for, the auditor also concludes that control is
ineffective. Investors will need to know why the financial reporting
process cannot simply rely upon auditor testing. Absent explanations of
this sort, PCAOB's contemplated early warning system will fail to deliver
meaningful warnings.
6o. See supra notes I9-2o and accompanying text.
6i. AUDMNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 7 193.
62. Id. 1 194.
63. This logic implies compelling auditor disclosure of significant deficiencies as well as material
weaknesses. AUDmNo STANDARD No. 2 does not follow this logic. Whether federal securities law
should follow this logic or AUDMNo STANDARD No. 2 will depend on the particular factual context in
which the issue arises. See infra text accompanying notes 127-128.
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By increasing the transparency of the financial reporting process,
PCAOB's new early warning system reflects the view that investors
rather than auditors should be the ultimate judges of financial statement
reliability. To produce more informed investors, auditors must provide
detailed information as to their methodology. The fundamental
argument for providing more meaningful details in reporting is the
importance placed on control as the key to fair financial reporting and
the decision in SOX and Auditing Standard No. 2 to make this reporting
process public."
Finally, since auditors are required to opine on management's
assertions on control effectiveness, users will reasonably expect them to
fully test control and explain their testing processes along with their
conclusions. Otherwise, an expectations gap arises between what
investors believe auditor assurance means and what assurance auditors
actually provide. The potential for an expectations gap raises issues
concerning auditor liability. As the following discussion shows, the
interplay between Auditing Standard No. 2 and existing auditor liability
rules is awkward, suggesting a need to adjust related legal standards to
make the new early warning system effective.
II. AUDITOR LIABILITY AND CONFLICTING LEGAL INCENTIVES
The early warning system exposes auditors to new liability risks, and
PCAOB apparently intends to use these risks to promote the system's
effectiveness." In order to be successful, some adjustments to the legal
rules corresponding to PCAOB's changes in professional auditing
standards must be made.
Auditors are subject to civil liability when their work fails to satisfy
applicable legal requirements." Applicable legal requirements generally
derive from relevant auditing standards. Numerous federal securities law
sections address various wrongs.0 Principal laws include Section I I under
64. Cf AUDITING STANDARD NO. 2, supra note 5, app. E 1 E18 (testing internal control over
financial reporting "takes on added importance with the public nature of the internal control
reporting"). See infra Part III.
65. Under federal securities law, the SEC cannot promulgate rules extending beyond a statute's
scope. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212-14 (1976). However, this restriction does not
limit PCAOB from establishing generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) that impose
obligations on auditors that form the basis of legal standards of negligence, recklessness, or fraud.
66. Auditors are also subject to criminal liability, but this topic is beyond the scope of this Article.
Criminal liability for auditors can be based on a variety of federal statutes, including federal securities
laws, the False Statements Statute, the Mail Fraud Statute, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) Act. Compared to the substantial number of civil cases against auditors, there
are relatively few criminal cases against them (though when the latter are brought, the consequences
are usually more devastating). Still, AUDrrNG STANDARD No. 2 may provide additional theories of
criminal liability.
67. State common law also imposes on auditors the standard of care found in traditional tort law
applicable to professionals, the breach of which gives rise to claims for ordinary negligence. Gross
negligence involves reckless departures from GAAS. Auditing engagements are routinely conducted
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the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act) and Section io(b) under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).6 The statutes and
associated remedies are generally construed cumulatively. 69 So, for
example, a Section Io(b) claim can exist even if a Section ii claim also
exists.'
The greatest impact of PCAOB's new early warning system on
potential auditor liability revolves around an auditor's failure to disclose
adequately the existence and meaning of material weaknesses in control.
Failure to do so as Auditing Standard No. 2 requires would constitute a
departure from generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), which
usually amounts to negligence actionable under Section ii of the 1933
Act.
Additional liability may also result under Section io(b) because this
new auditor duty to disclose is likely to render auditors primary rather
than secondary actors when their disclosure is materially misstated or
misleading. If so, this strips them of protections available under the
Supreme Court's opinion in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver," where the Court held that, in private actions, Section
io(b) of the 1934 Act does not extend fraud liability to secondary actors
for aiding and abetting primary violations.72
The interplay is complex between these two legal standards and
pursuant to a written agreement that can form the basis for state-law breach of contract claims. As
these theories relate to private actions, they were dramatically reduced by preemptive provisions of
the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), Pub. Law No. 105-353, I12 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of i5 U.S.C.). See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1998).
These topics, including issues relating to whether third-parties have standing to bring such claims, are
beyond the scope of this Article.
68. Other laws include Section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, which creates private rights of action against
persons, including accountants, who "make or cause to be made" materially misleading statements in
reports or other documents filed with the SEC. I5 U.S.C. § 78r; see Ernst & Ernst, 425 U.S. at 211 n.31
("[L]iability extends to persons who, in reliance on such statements, purchased or sold a security
whose price was affected by the statements."). Auditors defend such claims by showing good faith and
lack of knowledge. See id. (defendants are "accorded the defense that [they] acted in 'good faith and
had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading"'). Another ground for liability is
Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, which imposes on auditors the duties of inquiry and disclosure, the
interpretation of which was deferred by the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst. 425 U.S. at 185;
Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 55I, 557 n.9 (1979); and Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 378 n.2 (1983). Open issues include whether Section 17(a) authorizes private rights of action. See,
e.g., Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d i (Ist Cir. 1998) (joining four other federal circuit courts in
denying that Section 17(a) creates private rights of action).
69. Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 384-86 (treating as cumulative Section Ii under the 1933 Act
and Section io(b) under the 1934 Act). It is not entirely clear whether all private rights of action under
the federal securities laws are cumulative or whether certain express private rights of action are
exclusive. See generally Barbara Bader Aldave, Neither Unusual nor Unfortunate? The Overlap of Rule
iob-5 with the Express Liability Provisions of the Securities Acts, 60 TEX. L. REv. 719 (1982).
70. Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 387.
71. 511 U.S. 164 (994).
72. Id. at i9o.
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PCAOB's early warning system. The key pressure point under Auditing
Stanford No. 2 is distinguishing between significant deficiencies, which
need not be disclosed, and material weaknesses, which must be disclosed.
Section I i liability risk will induce auditors to treat borderline control
irregularities as material weaknesses and provide public disclosure;
Section io(b) liability risk will induce auditors to treat such cases as
significant deficiencies and withhold public disclosure. The Section ii
incentive promotes Auditing Standard No. 2's early warning system; the
Section Io(b) incentive undermines it. A possible device to neutralize
this undesirable Section Io(b) bias is a safe harbor provision to protect
auditors from liability for forward-looking control statements under
Section io(b).
A. NEGLIGENT FAILURES IN THE EARLY WARNING SYSTEM UNDER SECTION I I
Section i i regulates registration statements for public offerings of
securities.73 It applies to auditors with respect to portions of a registration
statement they produced, prepared, or otherwise "expertised."74 Under
Auditing Standard No. 2, auditors give three opinions subject to Section
ii. Section i i's standard of care is good faith; its liability basis is
negligence.75 For auditors, standards of performance are generally fixed
by GAAS. 76 Auditors typically discharge their professional and legal
73. 15 U.S.C. §77k. Section II(a) of the 1933 Act is a long and cumbersome provision but
essentially provides for private rights of action by purchasers of securities sold using a registration
statement containing material misstatements or omissions on its effective date. See id. For auditors,
liability attaches with respect to financial statements in the registration statement when at least one of
the material misstatements or omissions appears in a statement certified by the auditor.
74. Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 381, n.It. See also id., n.13 (including "accountants who are
named as having prepared or certified the registration statement," citing 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a), and "only
for those matters which purport to have been prepared or certified by them"). Section is does not
reach "accountants with respect to parts of a registration statement which they are not named as
having prepared or certified." Id. at 387, n.22.
75. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. t85, 207-08 (1976).
[Section] iI of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private right of action for damages
when a registration statement includes untrue statements of material facts or fails to state
material facts necessary to make the statements therein not misleading.... [E]xperts such
as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a
"due diligence" defense. In effect, this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration statement for which he was
responsible by showing that "after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable ground[s]"
to believe that the statements for which he was responsible were true and there was no
omission of a material fact.
Id. See also Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 381-82 (declaring that Section ii is designed to assure
compliance using "a stringent standard of liability" on those playing direct roles in registered offerings,
including accountants).
76. See SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting alternative standard
of "whether the accountant.performed... audit functions in a manner that would have revealed to an
ordinary prudent investor, who examined the accountant's audits or other financial statements, a
reasonably accurate reflection of the financial risks such an investor presently bears or might bear in
the future [by investing] in the audited endeavor").
[Vo1. 55:1449
A UDITING'S NEW EARLY WARNING SYSTEM
obligations by complying with GAAS in good faith.77
Plaintiff-purchasers of registered securities need only show a
material misstatement or omission to establish a prima facie case under
Section I C8 Accountants have the burden of demonstrating due
diligence.79 Auditing Standard No. 2 does not change these provisions,
but it radically expands auditors' professional obligations and legal duties
concerning what due diligence requires. Auditing Standard No. 2 and
Section I I together create a strong incentive for auditor disclosure.8°
The common scenario Auditing Standard No. 2 addresses involves
the disclosure of material weaknesses in control and their effects on
substantive auditing tests concerning financial statement assertions.
Traditionally, auditors had no duty to disclose such weaknesses or their
effects on substantive audit testing. Courts deemed control irregularities
immaterial. Auditing Standard No. 2 changes these rules, imposing duties
on auditors to disclose and explain both material weaknesses and their
effects on the overall audit process.
This common scenario is epitomized by Monroe v. Hughes,81 a
bondholder class action against external auditors of a defunct issuer of
securities alleging violations of Section 1 1.8 The auditor furnished an
unqualified financial statement audit opinion with respect to the issuer's
77. See id. at 788.
78. See Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 381. ("If a plaintiff purchased a security issued pursuant
to a registration statement, he need only show a material misstatement or omission to establish his
prima facie case.")
79. Id. at 382. (citing i5 U.S.C. § 7 7 k(b)) (noting that while issuer liability is virtually absolute,
other defendants bear the burden of demonstrating due diligence). The classic case comprehensively
outlining the due diligence defense generally and as applied to external auditors is Escot v. Barchris
Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (announcing that auditors "should not be held to
a standard higher than that recognized in their profession").
80. Despite Section Ii's appeal to GAAS as the standard for auditor performance, there is no
bright-line test for determining whether an auditor meets its burden of establishing the due diligence
defense. At best, a judicial sliding scale evaluates discharge according to factors such as the
defendant's "knowledge, expertise, status with regard to the issuer.., and the degree of the
defendant's actual participation in the registration process and in preparing the registration materials."
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURTEs REGULATION § 7.4[1, at 366 (4 th ed. 2002). AUDITING
STANDARD No. 2 provides specific requirements and general factors that will be relevant to courts, and
the SEC, in case-by-case evaluations of auditor reasonableness under Section ii. SEC Rule 176
provides similar guidance, identifying various factors relevant to the inquiry. 17 C.F.R. § 230.176
(listing the following as relevant circumstances in determining whether a person's conduct constituted
a reasonable investigation or a reasonable ground for belief for meeting the Section i i(c) burden: type
of issuer, security, person, other relationships, and the reasonableness of any reliance on others). SEC
Rule 176 has had limited effect on judicial opinions applying Section II. See DONNA M. NAGY ET AL.,
SEcuRmEs LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 285 (2003).
81. 31 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 1994). Monroe exemplifies a class of such cases. E.g., In re Worlds of
Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 147o (9th Cir. 1994); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F. 2d 422
(6th Cir. 198o); In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
82. 31 F.3d 772. The opinion centers on Section ii claims against the auditor, but plaintiffs also
made Section io(b) claims against the auditor, and claims against the issuer's officers under state blue
sky laws.
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1987 and 1988 financial statements and provided a comfort letter with
respect to the six-month period immediately prior to the offering.83
In the 1988 audit, the auditor found internal control irregularities
and conferred with management about them. In light of these control
irregularities, the auditor expanded the scope of the 1988 audit by
performing more elaborate substantive testing.8 In its 1989 audit, the
auditor found significant deterioration in the issuer's internal control and
was unable to issue an unqualified financial statement opinion for that
fiscal year. The issuer collapsed later that year.
The bondholders' Section I I claim contended that the auditor
should have disclosed the discovered internal control irregularities in the
1988 audit. The court laid out the Section ii due diligence defense and
the negligence standard governing auditor liability, observing that good
faith compliance with GAAS discharges an auditor's professional
obligation to act with reasonable care.5
The court noted that the auditor determined the control
irregularities to be significant deficiencies, but not material weaknesses. 6
At the time, no legal or accounting authority required auditors to
disclose such irregularities publicly. Instead, auditors were to report
them to management and, if deemed necessary, expand the scope of their
financial audit." In Monroe, the auditor did both. Even if the control
problems had been material weaknesses rather than merely significant
deficiencies, the auditor would only have been required to inform
management of them, which the auditor did. For these reasons, the court
concluded that there was no basis or reason to treat the control
irregularities as material under Section I I.
Auditing Standard No. 2 changes this result for material weaknesses.
In effect, Monroe shows what the U.S. financial reporting system lacked:
it had no early warning system. There, the auditors were aware of control
irregularities, but had no duty to disclose them. Investors were stuck.
Now, however, Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to disclose
material weaknesses. Failure by auditors to do so would constitute a
departure from GAAS and a material omission under Section I i,
83. Id. at 773-74.
84. Before AUDMNG STANDARD No. 2, this was the auditor's key purpose in testing control-a
selective testing to determine requisite financial statement audit scope. After AUDITING STANDARD No.
2, the control audit still serves this function but also provides independent information that must be
publicly disclosed.
85. Monroe, 31 F.3d at 774 (also noting the relevance of good faith compliance with generally
accepted accounting principles).
86. Id. Under auditing standards in effect at the time, the irregularities were called "reportable
conditions," which the court described as significant deficiencies rather than material weaknesses.
87. American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) auditing standards adopted at
the time, but not yet effective, also required auditors to report significant deficiencies to the company's
board audit committee. Id. at 774-75.
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thereby exposing auditors to Section I I liability.8
Auditing Standard No. 2 affects the common scenario epitomized by
Monroe v. Hughes in three additional ways. First, in traditional financial
statement auditing, the existence of a material weakness in control
requires auditors to expand substantive audit testing. Allegations
concerning auditor failure to follow GAAS relating to control
deficiencies and weaknesses required plaintiffs to focus on whether
auditors properly expanded the scope of substantive audit testing.19 If
auditors did, then the plaintiffs' claim failed. Under Auditing Standard
No. 2, that is only one of the auditor's obligations. When facing material
weaknesses, auditors must also disclose them and their effects on
financial statement audit planning.
Second, consider the effect of control testing and effectiveness on
the financial statement audit. Traditionally, plaintiffs asserting a claim
based on control failure needed to show a connection between control
weaknesses and the financial statement audit.' That is no longer true.
Auditing Standard No. 2 defines these exercises as interrelated. 9' When
control is ineffective, auditors must disclose it and expand their
substantive audit testing. Failure to do either, whether or not there is a
88. The Monroe plaintiffs also argued before the lower court that the auditor should have
included in its letter either a qualification as to the scope of its audit or a statement that the issuer
might not be able to continue as a going concern. The lower court rejected these claims, and the
appellate court observed that professional standards would not require an auditor to include either
qualification solely on the grounds that it had discovered reportable conditions (or material
weaknesses) in internal control over financial reporting.
89. See Adam v. Silicon Valley Bancshares, 884 F. Supp. 1398, 1403 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Adam,
the complaint satisfied particularity-pleading requirements when alleging that auditors made
misrepresentations as to "faulty management practices, such as weak internal controls" and alleged
how this violated specific accounting standards as to specific non-performing loans the auditor failed
to disclose or, at minimum, which the auditor should have investigated further. Id. The Adam court
rejected the auditor's argument that allegations concerning a company's weak internal controls are not
actionable given that auditors have no independent duty to disclose findings regarding weak internal
controls. Id. In Adam, the claim was not that the auditor should have disclosed those deficiencies, but
rather that it knew or recklessly disregarded that, as a result of control deficiencies, the company's
financial statements (here loan loss reserves) were materially misstated and that the auditor did not
expand the scope of its audit. Id.
9o. See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc. Sec., 277 F.3d 658, 672 (3rd Cir. 2002) (stating that
scienter may not credibly be inferred from auditor's reliance on defective internal controls). Accepting
that the company's internal accounting controls may have been unreliable, the IKON court found that
no evidence indicated a connection between control deficiencies and the financial statement audit. Id.
The auditor examined control effectiveness, recommended various control improvements to
management, and while the overall internal control environment was effective, the firm did not rely on
testing of controls as the primary support for its financial statement audit opinion. Id. Accordingly, the
IKON court granted the auditor's motion for summary judgment due to the absence of "a genuine
issue of material fact from which a jury could conclude that [the auditor] knowingly or blindly adhered
to faulty internal controls or accounting practices." Id. (citing Danis v. USN Comm. Inc., 121 F. Supp.
2d 1183, 1195 (N.D. Il1. 2000) ("without more, auditor's knowledge about problems in a client's
operational systems could support an inference only of negligence, not recklessness")).
91. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 27; see PCOAB PREss Release, supra note 8
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provable connection between the financial statement audit and internal
control, exposes auditors to liability for negligent departures from
GAAS under Section i i.
Third, suppose an auditor fails to report significant deficiencies to a
company's management or audit committee. In the past, this was
considered legally irrelevant to auditor liability under Section i 1." Given
the central role of such communications in the new early warning system,
however, such a failure may expose auditors to Section ii liability. This
is especially the case if the audit committee fails to respond adequately to
the auditor's communication.
Although Auditing Standard No. 2 does not require auditors to
disclose significant deficiencies, it specifically states that an ineffective
audit committee can be treated as a significant deficiency or even as a
material weakness in certain circumstances.' For example, a good
argument exists that a significant deficiency in internal control plus an
audit committee's failure to respond to it produces a material weakness.
When this occurs, auditors who fail to disclose that they reported these
significant deficiencies to the audit committee and received an
inadequate response may face Section I I liability.
The effects of Auditing Standard No. 2 on the common scenario
epitomized by Monroe v. Hughes underscore the likely focus of future
litigation: the difference between a significant deficiency and material
weakness. As Monroe indicated, before Auditing Standard No. 2, the
distinction mattered only for internal purposes, for auditors had no
obligation to publicly disclose either. Auditing Standard No. 2
specifically requires auditors to disclose material weaknesses, but not
significant deficiencies.'
92. See In re SmarTalk Teleservices, Inc. Sec. Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 524 (S.D. Ohio 2000)
(treating as irrelevant claims that auditor failed to report control deficiencies to the company's audit
committee because the auditor had "no duty to mention in its audit report that it had spoken to
the audit committee about such issues"). The SmarTalk case also involved allegations similar to those
in Monroe v. Hughes. The court accepted the auditor's argument that its failure to disclose a
company's "lack of internal controls" did not violate GAAS or federal securities law because auditors
have no duty "to disclose [a company's] lack of internal controls." Id. at 522. As a matter of law, the
court held that "an auditor is under no duty to disclose in an audit report deficiencies in internal
controls." Id. at 523 (citing Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., 623 F. 2d 422, 432 (6th Cir. i98o )
(stating that AICPA does not require that audit reports disclose internal control weaknesses); In re
Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3 d 1407, 1417 (9 th Cir. 1994)). Despite these findings, other
allegations of misrepresentations in the audit report supported the SmarTalk plaintiffs negligent
misrepresentation claim.
93. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 59 ("Ineffective oversight by the audit
committee of the company's external financial reporting and internal control over financial reporting
should be regarded as at least a significant deficiency and is a strong indicator that a material weakness
in internal control over financial reporting exists.").
94- See AUDITNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 91 173(a), 175-177 (requiring modifications
to auditor reports when there is a material weakness). Cf AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5,
app. 91 207-14 (requiring communications to management, audit committees and boards of directors
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Under Section I I, auditors unsure of whether a control irregularity
is a significant deficiency or a material weakness will have a legal
incentive to err on the side of material weakness. Providing disclosure is
safer than not providing it. This inclination serves PCAOB's goal of
creating an early warning system. Auditors can use the threat of
disclosure to pressure for control improvements. Undercutting this
effect, however, are opposite incentives arising under Section io(b) that
encourage auditors to resolve uncertainties as significant deficiencies
rather than material weaknesses and avoid disclosure.
B. FRAUDULENT FAILURES AS PRIMARY VIOLATIONS UNDER SECTION IO(B)
In cases like Monroe v. Hughes, Section Io(b) claims for fraud were
easy to dismiss. A defendant must have a duty to disclose in order for a
plaintiff to sustain a Section io(b) claim, but auditors had no such duty.
Under Auditing Standard No. 2, however, auditors have such duties,
posing significant legal consequences under Section io(b) of the 1934
Act.
Section Io(b) addresses the purchase or sale of securities.95 Anyone
making material misstatements (or omissions) on which traders rely faces
liability as a primary violator under Section io(b) when they have a duty
of disclosure. 6 The standard is anti-fraud; the liability basis is scienter,9
generally meaning intent to deceive." As with Section II, Auditing
Standard No. 2 does not change these standards, but radically expands
auditor responsibilities and therefore their legal duties. Most
importantly, in certain circumstances, it may redefine auditor status as
primary rather than secondary actors.
include all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses).
95. Section io of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any person... (b) to use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.., any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors." 15 U.S.C. § 78j. SEC
Rule Iob-5 encompasses substantially the same matters as Section io, but uses language drawn from
Section I7(a) of the 1933 Act by referring to making any untrue statement of material fact or omitting
to state material facts necessary to make statements not misleading, and specifically prohibiting fraud
and deceit using any device, scheme or artifice.
96. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
97. For private actions, negligence alone does not create liability; for SEC enforcement
proceedings, showing negligence may suffice. See SEC v. Arthur Young, 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. I979)
(assuming so without deciding).
98. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976) (additionally the statute uses the
terms manipulative, device and contrivance). Scienter is from a Latin word meaning knowingly; it
generally relates to a state of mind seen as intentional or at least reckless as opposed to negligent or
grossly negligent. The Supreme Court has deferred deciding whether it includes recklessness. Id.;
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 68o, 686 n.5 (I98O); Herman & Maclean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 379 n.4
(1983). Private Section io(b) claims are proven by a preponderance of the evidence standard, as in
other civil actions, and not by the higher clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 387-88 (noting
that the preponderance standard also applies to SEC enforcement proceedings under Section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act).
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After deferring in major decisions on the issue of whether secondary
actors face Section io(b) liability for aiding and abetting fraud,' the
Supreme Court rejected the possibility in Central Bank of Denver v. First
Interstate Bank of Denver."m Auditors cannot be liable in private actions
under Section Io(b) when they are simply secondary actors serving as
functional accomplices to fraud.'' However, the Court stated that this
does not prevent holding auditors liable as primary actors when the facts
indicate sufficient involvement to constitute them as such. 
02
Consequently, in post-Central Bank private actions, plaintiffs would
allege that auditors acted as primary violators of Section io(b), and not
as mere accomplices."cu
Lower courts wrestled with the distinction between primary and
secondary actors after Central Bank.'°4 Most courts adopted a bright-line
rule which provided that a defendant, such as an auditor, must make a
false or misleading statement to the public to be liable as a primary actor
under Section io(b).' °' Absent such a statement, the actor was at best an
99. The Supreme Court expressly deferred addressing the aiding and abetting issue in both Ernst
& Ernst, 425 U.S. at 191-92, n.7 and Herman & Maclean, 459 U.S. at 379, n.5.
OO. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
Ioi. Central Bank's limitation on aiding and abetting liability applies to private actions; the SEC
has separate statutory authority to pursue this theory. See 1934 Act, § 20(e) (authorizing SEC actions
under Section 2I(d) for injunctions and money damages against "any person that knowingly provides
substantial assistance to another person in violation of a provision of the [1934 Act]"). The
Department of Justice also possesses such authority for pursuing criminal aiding and abetting
generally. See i8 U.S.C. § 2.
1O2. Central Bank, 511 U.S. at 191.
103. See HAZEN, supra note 8o, § 12.25, at 69o.
104. Scholars struggled too. E.g., Symposium, The Scope of Private Securities Litigation: In Search
of Liability Standards for Secondary Defendants, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (I999); Robert A. Prentice,
Locating That "Indistinct" and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line Between Primary and Secondary Liability
Under Section io(b), 75 N.C. L. REV. 691 (1997); Robert A. Prentice, Conceiving the Inconceivable and
Judicially Implementing the Preposterous: The Premature Demise of Respondeat Superior Liability
Under Section ro(b), 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1325 (997); Donald C. Langevoort, Words on High About Rule
rob-5: Chiarella's History, Central Bank's Future, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 865 0995).
lO5. E.g., Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1205 (ilth Cir. 2OOl); Wright v. Ernst &
Young L.L.P., 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998) ("a secondary actor cannot incur primary liability...
for a statement not attributed to that actor at the time of its dissemination"); Klein v. Boyd, FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 19o,136, 90,317 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding by panel that secondary actor potentially liable
as primary actor when creating fraudulent statements spoken by another, but circuit en banc vacated
decision and parties subsequently settled); Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997); Anixter
v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1226, 1227 (ioth Cir. 1996) (holding accountants not liable
despite providing significant or substantial assistance to primary fraudsters because liability requires
that they "must themselves make a false or misleading statement (or omission) that they know or
should know will reach potential investors"); In re JWP Inc. Sec. Litig., 928 F. Supp. 1239, 1255-56
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); In re MTC Elec. Techs. S'holder Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); In re
Leslie Fay Co. Sec. Litig., 871 F. Supp. 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Lycan v. Walters, 904 F. Supp. 884, 901
n.I2 (S.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that, after Central Bank, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive motions for
summary judgment by asserting that auditors "assisted in the perpetration of a fraud"); In re Kendall
Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28, 28 n.i (D. Mass. 1994) (The court found no
liability for accounting firm that reviewed and approved fraudulent financial statements because they
did not actually engage in reporting the statements, so the statements were not attributable to the firm.
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aider and abettor, outside the reach of Section io(b) liability.
Other courts favored a substantial participation approach, exposing
auditors to Section Io(b) liability when their involvement with those
telling falsehoods were not clearly secondary, but sufficiently substantial
to render it primary. ' Under this approach, auditor silence is not enough
to prevent auditor liability as a primary actor. Another person's
misstatement could be attributed to a silent auditor if the auditor
significantly participated in the activity where the misstatement was
made."°7
Auditing Standard No. 2 dramatically changes this legal landscape.
Under it, auditors are required to provide their opinions on internal
control over financial reporting. When they conclude that control is
effective when it is not, the situation seems to be similar to concluding
that the financial statements are fair and conform to GAAP when they in
fact are not. In that case, they would normally be seen as secondary
actors, insulated from Section Io(b) liability.
However, unlike an adverse financial statement opinion, an adverse
control opinion requires additional auditor disclosure."' Auditors must
"While participation in the 'structuring' of transactions may be evidence of [auditor's] knowledge at
the time it provided its audit opinion, the participation in the 'structuring' does not constitute the
making of a material misstatement.... [I]t is clear that after Central Bank, only the making of material
misstatements (or omissions) will be actionable under Section Io(b)."); Vosgerichian v. Commodore
Int'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding that auditor advice and guidance to person
making fraudulent misrepresentations do not render auditor a primary actor).
io6. In re Software Toolworks, Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (primary
liability possible for "significant role" in preparing letter to the SEC); Cashman v. Coopers &
Lybrand, 877 F. Supp. 425, 432 (N.D. Ill. 1995); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F. Supp. 960, 97o
(C.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that primary liability exists when auditor is "intricately involved" in creating
false documents); Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Musick, Peeler, & Garrett, 871 F. Supp. 381, 389-90
(S.D. Cal. 1994) (holding accountant's role in drafting prospectus supports primary liability
characterization even though accountant not named in prospectus).
io7. A new position arose between the two extremes of the bright-line and substantial
participation tests. This approach imposed liability but only if the secondary actor originated the fraud,
such as by preparing documentation constituting misrepresentations. Courts were split on this new
variation, though it famously provided the basis for claims against those aiding in the Enron fraud
case. See In re Enron Corp. Sec. Derivative & ERISA Litig., 235 F. Supp. 2d 549 (S.D. Tex. 2002). In
Enron Corp., the court denied an auditor's motion to dismiss, announcing that auditors can be primary
violators of Section io(b) when they knowingly design transactions with a propensity to confuse and
mislead investors. Id. at 611. In the case, the SEC argued that primary liability attaches to secondary
actors when they create fraudulent documents. This is so whether or not they make public statements
or have public statements of other actors attributed to them. See also Carley Capital Group v. Deloitte
& Touche, L.L.P., 27 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 1998). But see Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l Inc., 256
F.3 d 1194, 1205 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting this standard in suit against law firm, adopting instead the
bright-line approach).
lO8. In financial statement auditing, even the most severe circumstances (e.g. when a company's
capacity to continue as a going concern is in doubt) require virtually no auditor narrative. Rather,
auditors can simply cross-reference footnotes to the financial statements so disclosing and indicate that
no adjustments to the financial statements have been made. See FRANK C. MINTER, ET AL., HANDBOOK
OF MODERN AcCOUeriNG AND AUDrTNG § C15.O4[2][a]-[b], at CI5-48 (2003) (discussing SAS 59).
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describe material weaknesses, their actual and potential effects on
financial statements and related control objectives, and their effects on
the auditor's financial statement audit. When these disclosures are false
or misleading, the speaker becomes a primary actor under any of the
various formulations interpreting Central Bank. They are certainly within
Section io(b)'s reach under the substantial participation approach and
will likely become primary actors under the bright-line rule favored by
most courts.' 9
To this extent, Auditing Standard No. 2 may be seen to nullify
Central Bank as to control audits. Of course, it only nullifies it through
indirect means, by changing the nature of an auditor's professional
obligations, not by changing the text of Section io(b) or the Supreme
Court's interpretation of it. But the effect is the same for auditors. The
interplay between this result of Auditing Standard No. 2 and Central
Bank, however, raises a complexity that PCAOB probably neither
foresaw nor intended.
If an auditor issuing an unqualified control opinion is a secondary
actor insulated from Section io(b) liability while an auditor issuing an
adverse opinion explaining material weaknesses is a primary actor
subject to Section io(b) liability, then auditors have a clear legal
incentive to prefer the former. For control irregularities at the border,
this will induce auditors to characterize them as significant deficiencies
rather than material weaknesses. But this bias undermines PCAOB's
goal to provide early warnings of future financial statement unreliability
and negates the pressure to improve internal control. It also conflicts
with the opposite effect arising under Section I I, which induces auditors
to err on the side of designating close cases as material weaknesses.
The effects of Section Io(b) and Section i I cannot be counted on to
offset each other. These sections address different circumstances and
provide different legal standards and procedures, even though they are
cumulative and often both apply to a particular set of facts. Section I I
covers registration statements, whereas Section io(b) covers all matters
in connection with the purchase or sale of securities."' Moreover, for
io9. Under the bright-line rule, the concept of omission generally relevant to Section io(b) claims
becomes substantially muted. Otherwise, this could be a reliable way to overcome the skewed
incentives being discussed. That is, using an omissions approach, AunrnNo STANDARD No. 2 could be
cited to claim the auditor has a duty to disclose and violated that duty through the omission. This still
is not quite the same as the primary actor concept. Even if it were, the procedural posture of omissions
versus misstatement cases differs. In a misstatement case, there is no question the auditor became a
primary actor; in the omissions case, that matter is not entirely free from doubt and under applicable
heightened pleading standards, it would be far more difficult to sustain this claim than one relating to
misstatements actually uttered. Accordingly, the skewed incentives endure. Put differently, in contrast
to Section it where auditors have every legal incentive to disclose and describe control irregularities
under AuDIING STANDARD No. 2, Section Io(b)'s primary-secondary actor distinction creates
significantly different legal consequences yielding mixed incentives at best.
iio. In addition, Section ii imposes a tough standard of obligation (negligence) compared to
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disclosures outside registered offerings, where Section i i does not apply,
Section Io(b) effects are not offset by the opposite Section i i incentives.
Thus, Section io(b) strongly influences auditors to resolve uncertain
cases of control weakness as significant deficiencies rather than material
weaknesses.
The facts from a classic Supreme Court case, Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder,' illustrate this effect. For 24 years, the president of a
brokerage firm sold fraudulent securities and converted investor funds to
his own use."' These transactions were conducted outside the firm's
usual dealings with customers, directly between investors and the
president."3 They did not appear in the firm's records or reports. The
firm's auditors failed, however, to discover certain unorthodox internal
control practices at the company, including a rule that no one but the
president could open his mail, even when he was away.'
4
The plaintiffs argued that had the auditors conducted a proper audit,
they would have discovered the abnormality and would have had to
disclose it as an irregular procedure."' The Supreme Court rejected their
claims. The facts, however, appear to involve precisely the kind of
Section io(b) (fraud). Section i i also contains numerous procedural requirements for plaintiffs not
present in Section Io(b). Although Section is imposes a more stringent standard of obligation, it also
applies to a narrower class of persons and transactions and provides various procedural protections,
such as posting bonds for costs and a one-year statute of limitations. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 209-10 (1976).
For Section Io(b) actions, the current statute of limitations period is two-years-from-
constructive knowledge, subject to a maximum five-year period of repose. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
§ 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) (Supp. 2002) (negating Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501
U.S. 350, 359-61 (19I), which provided a one-year-from-constructive-knowledge limitations period,
subject to a three-year period of repose, in turn altering the traditional judicial approach of borrowing
relevant limitations period from analogous common law fraud context).
As a result of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), pleading rules
for Section Io(b) claims are stricter than for Section is claims. Discovery is stayed and motions to
dismiss granted unless a complaint pleads "with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that
the defendant acted with the required state of mind." Exchange Act § 2ID(b)(2)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2)-(3) (2003). Cf., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 286 B.R. 33 (D. Mass. 2002) (noting that
directors ignored auditor warnings of control weakness). Section io(b) claims can be dismissed on a
motion to dismiss under these heightened pleading standards, whereas Section i1 claims invite the due
diligence defense, which is an affirmative defense not available at the motion to dismiss stage (the
court examines only the sufficiency of a complaint). E.g., In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 294 F. Supp.
2d 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
iii. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
112. Id. at 188.
113. Id.
114. Id. at i9o.
115. Id. The lower court rejected the auditor's defense that it could not be held liable for aiding
and abetting under io(b) on negligence claims alone. Id. at 191-92. It referenced Section I7a-5,
requiring auditors to inquire of and provide disclosure concerning the brokerage firm's "internal
control system." Id. In the pre-Central Bank era, such a failure exposed the auditor to liability in
damages for aiding and abetting. The lower court held that genuine issues of material fact arose as to
whether the auditor's failure to discover the mail rule breached the duty and whether its discovery
would have prevented the fraud. Id. at 192.
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control irregularity Auditing Standard No. 2 directs auditors to detect
and disclose if detected. But if the call is close as to whether the
irregularity is a significant deficiency or a material weakness, Central
Bank's primary/secondary actor distinction creates an incentive for
auditors to choose the significant deficiency characterization and
withhold disclosure. This diminishes the potential power of the early
warning system.
The skewed liability incentives this interplay creates will reinforce
other biases present in the new early warning system, independent of
legal rules. Auditing Standard No. 2 requires auditors to evaluate the
existence of material weaknesses and disclose them if identified. In
practice, auditors will understand the potentially severe consequences of
the material weakness characterization for issuers. The automatic
adverse opinion required by Auditing Standard No. 2 in such cases risks
discouraging auditors from elevating significant deficiencies to the
material weakness level."6
This bias may lead auditors to approach the question of materiality
as whether the potential for misstated financials is pervasive or
overwhelmingly material to the financial statements taken as a whole. If
not, they may conclude that no material weakness exists-even if under
the more direct approach an objective audit would indicate that a
material weakness exists. Auditors indulging this bias will risk allowing
the early warning system to fail. If it does, and subsequent financials
cannot be given unqualified opinions, they will not face Section io(b)
liability given that such opinions position them as secondary, not
primary, actors. Although Section II will offset this bias somewhat for
registered offerings, an additional adjustment to relevant legal standards
seems necessary to help promote the aspirations of Auditing Standard
No. 2 as an early warning system.
C. PROMOTING THE IDEAL
The ideal early warning system should produce auditor disclosure
accurately reflecting the calibrated risk of future financial misstatements.
That is, it should point out areas where the likelihood of misstatements
are more than remote without overwhelming investors with information
concerning risks that are remote or less than remote. Liability threats can
help direct disclosure toward the optimal balance. But the conflicting
incentives created by the interplay between Auditing Standard No. 2 and
existing legal rules governing auditor liability impair this capability.
How can legal rules be adjusted to facilitate the early warning
system's objective of providing meaningful content to financial statement
116. E.g., Comment Letter to PCAOB from Association of the Bar of the City of New York,
PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 68 (2oo3).
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users? One way is to insure that auditor statements concerning material
weaknesses in control do not expose auditors to Section io(b) liability as
primary actors. This would better position auditors to provide the early
warnings Auditing Standard No. 2 contemplates. However, it would also
threaten doctrinal incoherence in Section io(b) case law, which applies
not only to auditors but to all actors from issuers to attorneys,
underwriters and others.
Nor would it be appropriate to simply unite liability effects under
Sections io(b) and ii. The two statutes address different circumstances,
apply different legal standards, and employ differing procedural
directives."7 If Section io(b) risks were increased to match those under
Section ii, excessive material weakness conclusions could result and
produce too many warnings, which would undermine the effectiveness
and usefulness of the early warning system. ' If Section ii risks were
reduced to match those under Section io(b), this could neutralize the
directive power of liability threats.
A more tailored doctrinal possibility is to develop safe harbor
protections for forward-looking auditor statements regarding control
under Section Io(b) that parallel existing safe harbors for issuer
statements. Although doing so may neutralize some of the incentives that
liability threats create, other pressures on auditors from new auditor
independence rules and PCAOB oversight should offer sufficient
counterbalancing effects to generate a system likely to optimize
disclosure in the early warning system.
i. Forward-Looking Disclosure
In traditional financial statement audits, auditors opine about
financial statements prepared on a prior date and for a prior period of
time. The information is historical. In control audits, auditors opine
about the potential future consequences of existing information. True,
some required control-audit disclosure is historical or backward-looking
(e.g., stating PCAOB's definition of material weakness and reporting the
existence of a material weakness, including what auditors did about it in
their substantive testing). But in describing material weaknesses as early
warnings, disclosure becomes inherently forward-looking. The concept of
material weakness is defined as a risk that material misstatements will
not be detected or prevented in the future. Auditing Standard No. 2
requires auditors to describe material weaknesses along with their actual
and potential future effects on financial statements.
Consider, for example, a material weakness in control governing the
117. See supra note 110.
iI8. Cf. Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light. Information Overload and its Consequences for
Securities Regulation, 8I WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2003) (offering a tentative assessment of the risks of
prevailing inclinations towards generating increasing volumes of information in light of emerging
empirical studies concerning investor psychology and behavioral finance).
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creation of invoices. Assume company policy requires a supervisor to
approve invoices prepared by shipping clerks and an audit indicates this
policy is not closely followed. Auditor disclosure of this situation will
include historical/factual information plus forward-looking information.
The former includes auditor disclosure defining the concept of material
weakness, identifying the invoice-control weakness, and explaining how
it led the auditor to expand the scope of his substantive audit tests (such
as by contacting a larger sampling of customers to verify the existence of
credit purchases from the company).
To make related disclosure meaningful, however, auditors must also
disclose more forward-looking information. Auditors must disclose how
this weakness increases the risk of material misstatements in the
company's accounts receivable line item and how this has the potential to
inflate sales and earnings. Auditors should also disclose the steps being
taken or that could be taken to cure this weakness, such as enhanced
employee training or additional supervision, and their potential effects
,on neutralizing the risk.
In certain cases, disclosure should explain how a particular material
weakness relates to the company's overall control environment and
financial reporting efficacy, all of which are likely to be forward-looking.
In the invoice-control example, if this is the only control weakness
detected, disclosure indicating that this weakness should have no effect
on other financial statement line items such as inventory or the cost-of-
goods-sold would be useful to investors. Auditors should also be
encouraged to indicate the likelihood of designated potential effects and
to clarify other potential effects that are less likely or not likely at all.
The amount of forward-looking information thus generated is
limitless. Disclosure granularity is necessary to enable financial
statement users to accurately calibrate the significance of control
weaknesses in a potentially infinite variety of contexts. Such
particularization is necessary to make the early warning system effective.
But since much of the requisite disclosure is inherently forward-looking,
substantial risks exist that the auditor's best judgment and guidance will
be, with hindsight, incorrect. Absent some legal adjustments, this risk,
coupled with Section io(b)'s incentives to treat such control irregularities
as significant deficiencies, will discourage auditors from providing
optimal disclosure and render the early warning system substantially
inert.
This illustration suggests that the early warning system for control
audits is akin to a parallel system of issuer forward-looking disclosure
that requires and/or encourages issuers to provide information
concerning trends and uncertainties in their businesses."9 Whereas the
i i9. Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2004).
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existing forward-looking disclosure system focuses on generating early
views of business substance, PCAOB's new early warning system focuses
on generating early views of financial reporting processes. A key lesson
from the development of the substantive forward-looking disclosure
regime is the need to provide incentives and protections for those
making statements about the future.
As the system for issuer forward-looking disclosure evolved in the
i98os, the SEC, Congress, and courts all offered safe harbors. These
doctrines insulated issuers from liability in private actions arising from
forward-looking statements if the disclosure was accompanied by
appropriate cautionary language and other conditions were met.2'
Evidence indicates that this system enhanced the overall quality of
information and its interpretation.2 ' Developing similar doctrines for
auditing's new early warning system should also promote ideal auditor
disclosure and its interpretation.
Generally, existing safe harbors governing issuer forward-looking
information do not apply to auditors. "' Despite the recent revolution in
auditing set off by Congress and the SEC, neither body has created any
See generally, Quinton F. Seamons, Requirements and Pitfalls of MD&A Disclosure, 25 Sic. REG. L.J.
239 (997).
12o. The SEC did so in Securities Act Rule 175 and Exchange Act Rule 3b-6; Congress did so in
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, I5 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Section 27A of
the 1933 Act) and I5 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (Section 21E of the 1934 Act); and courts did so using the
judicially-created bespeaks caution doctrine, see, e.g., Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799 (1ith Cir.
1999); Rubenstein v. Collins, 2o F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994); In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig.,
7 F.3d 357 (3 d Cir. 1993); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635 (6th Cir. 1993);.
121. JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 6 (9 th
ed. 2003) (citing Artyom Durev et al., Law, Share Price Accuracy and Economic Performance: The
New Evidence, PRESENTATION AT THE AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION ANNUAL MEETING
(May 12, 2001) (examining the impact of mandatory forward-looking disclosure in MD&A on share
prices)).
122. For example, statutory safe harbors define forward-looking statements to mean:
(A) a statement containing a projection of revenues, income (including income loss),
earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital expenditures, dividends, capital
structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of the plans and objectives of management for future operations, including
plans or objectives relating to the products or services of the issuer;
(C) a statement of future economic performance, including any such statement contained in
a discussion and analysis of financial condition by the management or in the results of
operations included pursuant to the rules and regulations of the Commission;
(D) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C);
(E) any report issued by an outside reviewer retained by an issuer, to the extent that the
report assesses a forward-looking statement made by the issuer; or
(F) a statement containing a projection or estimate of such other items as may be specified
by rule or regulation of the Commission.
Securities Exchange Act, § 21E(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(i)(i) (2004). Item (E) would encompass auditor
attestations governing assertions made in management's discussion and analysis section, a service
issuers have not, to my best knowledge, engaged auditors to perform.
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auditor safe harbors, while PCAOB lacks authority to do so.' 3 It may be
desirable for Congress or the SEC to adopt requisite protections, ex ante,
that would provide guidance to auditors and help develop more uniform
disclosure in this new system.'24 It may also be necessary for the judiciary
to participate in shaping the exact contours of this system. Ultimately, it
may be ideal for all three sources of authority to participate in providing
the requisite boundaries, just as all three participated in developing safe
harbor provisions and conditions for the existing forward-looking
disclosure system.
Absent Congressional or SEC action, however, courts should be
encouraged to develop such a system independently. Courts did this for
issuer forward-looking disclosure by developing protections under the
bespeaks caution doctrine.1"5 This provided a case-by-case evaluation of
whether forward-looking information was accompanied by sufficient
cautionary language to alert a reasonable investor to the information's
tentative quality.'1
2
Some common scenarios emerge in issuer forward-looking
123. Cf AUDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 1 212 ("Because of the potential for
misinterpretation of the limited degree of assurance associated with the auditor issuing a written
report representing that no significant deficiencies were noted during an audit of internal control over
financial reporting the auditor should not issue such representations.").
124. The SEC has power to do so. See Securities Exchange Act § 2IE(c)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-
2(c)(4) (zooo)); Securities Act, § 27A(g)-(h), 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(g)-(h) (2ooo). For example, statutory
safe harbors defining forward-looking statements relating to auditor control opinions could piggyback
on existing standards quoted in note 122 above, as follows:
(A) a statement containing an opinion as to the potential effects of material weaknesses in
internal control over financial reporting relating to effects on projections in revenues,
income (including income loss), earnings (including earnings loss) per share, capital
expenditures, dividends, capital structure, or other financial items;
(B) a statement of recommendations, and proposed plans and objectives for future
improvements in internal control over financial reporting, including plans or objectives
relating to material weaknesses; and
(C) any statement of the assumptions underlying or relating to any statement described in
subparagraph (A) or (B).
This suggestion is for illustration only; additional refinement would likely be required. Partly for this
reason, it is probably just as well to recognize authority to develop this doctrine within federal courts.
125. While the SEC was the real engine of the forward-looking disclosure regime, and it and
Congress both furnished safe harbors, ultimate interpretation and development of the doctrine's
contours fell to the courts using the bespeaks caution doctrine. See generally, Donald C. Langevoort,
Disclosures that "Bespeak Caution," 49 Bus. LAW. 481 (1994).
126. Courts provided varying formulations of the bespeaks caution doctrine, though generally they
applied to both misstatements and omissions, solely to prospective information, with particularized
cautionary language related directly to the relevant disclosure. COFFEE & SELIGMAN, supra note 121, at
1017-20 (summarizing cases and positions by circuit). In general, however, it is a pragmatic application
of basic principles of securities law, chiefly designed to balance generating useful but contingent
information against dangers that issuers could hide behind bad news by cloaking it in cautionary garb.
See Rubenstein v. Collins, 2o F.3d 164, 167 (5th Cir. 1994). Some courts even hinted at using the
doctrine to protect defendants from disclosure liability concerning the effectiveness of internal control.
See In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. Litig., 35 F.3d 1407 (9th Cir. 1994) (warning by issuer of ongoing
attempts to improve control implicitly seen as forward-looking).
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disclosure. Such disclosures often include optimistic projections that
never materialize, with stock-price drops leading to lawsuits by security
holders who purchased or held securities during the relevant time
period.'27 The reverse situation also arises: issuers offer gloomy forecasts
that turn out to be wrong, producing opposite effects. ,8 Courts use
substantially similar tools to evaluate both types of disclosure and their
related claims.
Under auditing's new early warning system, many cases will likely
involve warnings of risks that are never realized. Auditor warnings based
on material weaknesses signal more-than-remote risks of future financial
misstatements. When the risks are subsequently not realized, stock prices
will rise, leading to lawsuits by security holders who sold during the
relevant time period. Safe harbors should be provided for such
statements.
More importantly, safe harbors are needed for assuring statements.
A key virtue of the safe harbor protections for auditor early warnings
should be to encourage auditors to calibrate the significance of particular
control weaknesses. This involves describing not only the potential risks
of such a weakness, but also singling out issues that a particular material
weakness does not implicate. This also enables financial statement users
to rank material weaknesses based on their severity.
The need for this kind of textured disclosure to make early warnings
more meaningful calls for balancing. Although legislative or regulatory
doctrines can be developed to provide guidance, it will likely fall to
judges to develop the doctrinal bases governing safe harbors for auditor
disclosure. This will entail adapting the bespeaks caution doctrine for
application to auditor early warnings. Adaptation will be necessary to
recognize differences between issuer forward-looking disclosure and
auditor forward-looking disclosure. Issuer disclosure centers on
substantive business prospects and financial results. Auditor control
disclosure centers on procedural aspects of the financial reporting
process addressed to the fair reporting of financial transactions.
With those differences in mind, judges can appeal to traditional
jurisprudence concerning the relation between federal securities law and
GAAS to develop appropriate responses and guidance. For example,
federal securities case law routinely acknowledges that auditors
discharge their legal duties by complying with professional standards
articulate as GAAS. But they also recognize that compliance with
GAAS does not alone satisfy legal obligations;'29 more importantly,
127. E.g., Grossman v. Novel], Inc., i2o F.3d 1112 (ioth Cir. 1997).
I28. An example of this in the case of issuers is Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 8o2 F.2d 703 (4th Cir.
1986), cert. denied 479 U.S. io65 (1987).
129. United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 8o5-o6 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.), cert. denied, 397
U.S. ioo6 (i97o) (concerning GAAP); SEC v. Arthur Young, 59o F.2d 785, 788-89 (9th Cir. 1979)
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meeting legal obligations does not always depend on compliance with
GAAS."3 ' Legal standards supercede auditing standards. In the case of
Auditing Standard No. 2, judges can accept its content as specifying
applicable professional standards, but also adjust applicable legal
standards as necessary to fulfill the overall objectives of the early
warning system. An adapted bespeaks caution doctrine can promote
these objectives while sustaining the doctrinal coherence of Section io(b)
jurisprudence.
2. Recovering Trust
It may seem strange to offer safe harbors to a profession whose
diminished trustworthiness prompted Auditing Standard No. 2 in the
first place. But other changes in the auditing profession may, when
coupled with such safe harbors, operate to provide a system better
geared towards promoting optimal auditor disclosure as contemplated by
Auditing Standard No. 2's early warning system.
SOX and PCAOB promote control transparency due, in part, to
diminished public confidence in financial reporting caused by debacles in
the late 1990s and early 2000S. Auditing standard setters, managers, and
auditors lost the public trust necessary to vest them with the discretion
they previously enjoyed. Congress reflected public disgust with these
groups in SOX, the catalyst for PCAOB and its reforms. PCAOB-
mandated control transparency was a way to curtail the need for that
discretion by requiring deeper disclosure of the processes by which
managers and auditors reach their conclusions in or concerning financial
reports.
As for auditing standard setters, SOX created and anointed PCAOB
in an attempt to insulate audit standard setting from auditor lobbying.
For generations, establishing GAAS had been the province of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA). The
AICPA used various structures to exercise this authority, all of which
were subject to direct influence by the profession.'3' SOX created
PCAOB'32 as a self-regulatory organization,'33 with the SEC appointing
(dicta concerning GAAS).
13o. E.g., Bradford-White Corp. v. Ernst & Whinney, 872 F.2d 1153 (3d Cir. 1989); In re Carter-
Wallce, Inc. Sec. Litig., 15o F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Chill v. General Electric Co., ioi F.3d 263, 270 (2d
Cir. 1996); see also In re First Union Corp. Sec. Litig., 128 F. Supp. 871 (W.D.N.C. 2001); In re E. Spire
Comm., Inc. Sec. Litig. 127 F. Supp. 2d 734 (D. Md. 2OO).
I3I. Until SOX, the AICPA's Auditing Standards Board promulgated GAAS. It was in turn
supervised by another AICPA arm: the SEC Practice Section's Public Oversight Board (POB). The
POB was funded by the AICPA. The AICPA also serves as a trade group for the public accounting
profession. Partners from the largest accounting firms invariably participated directly with standard-
setters in promulgating auditing standards.
132. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. 2002)).
133. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § o7, 15 U.S.C. § 7217 (Supp. 2002)).
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and overseeing its five-member board.'34 Its structural features were
intended to strengthen PCAOB's independence from the auditing
profession.3'
Reflecting managerial mistrust, PCAOB announced that SOX's
Section 404 auditor attestation is intended to give shareholders and the
public "an independent reason to rely on management's description of
the company's internal control over financial reporting."'' 6 Reflecting a
mistrust of auditors, the early warning system denies that their final word
is acceptable, at least when material weaknesses are present. Auditors
must disclose their conclusions and explain what they mean, leaving
investors to make informed judgments about the reliability of the
auditor's opinion.
SOX was accompanied by rhetoric announcing its revolutionary
quality, but careful textual study indicates that the statute itself created
no revolution.'37 The one silver bullet concerned the creation of PCAOB
and its mandate."" In Auditing Standard No. 2, PCAOB lives up to the
rhetoric.'39 Critics contended that PCAOB exceeded SOX's mandate in
promulgating Auditing Standard No. 2 and questioned the enlarged
scope of legal liability risk created by the early warning system."0
PCAOB dismissed these criticisms. It was created to set standards
on an ongoing basis and its authorization is open-ended, not constrained
by particular SOX provisions or SEC regulations.' Unlike the SEC,
whose power is constrained by the Congressional legislation granting it,
134. Monitoring duties include reviewing audit procedures and policies, registering public
accounting firms, maintaining standards concerning audit reports, and the conduct of oversight,
disciplining and sanctioning of public accounting firms.
135. Several structural differences stand out: PCAOB is a creature of statute, not grace; a majority
of its five members must be non-CPAs and its chair cannot have practiced public accounting during
the year before becoming chair; it is funded by public company shareholders, not the AICPA; and
members must be full-time and serve five-year terms (with a two-term limit) and are subject to
removal for cause by the SEC.
136. PCAOB Release Accompanying AUDrTNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 8 at 3.
137. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform
(And It Might Just Work), 35 U. CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003).
138. Id. at 919, 945-46.
139. One PCAOB Board member opined that the new regime of internal control certification and
attestation "revolutionizes" managerial and auditor attention to internal control. Statement of Daniel
L. Goelzer, PCAOB, on The Proposed Standard for An Audit of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements (Oct. 7, 2003).
140. E.g., Comment Letters to PCAOB from: Kimball, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter
No. 38 (Nov. 18, 2003) (noting also that it had written to Indiana Senators and Congressmen
protesting and seeking help); GlaxoSmithKline, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 62
(Nov. 21, 2003); Pfizer, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 69 (Nov. 21, 2003); Institute of
Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 102
(Nov. 21, 2003); Cummins, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 123 (Nov. 2i, 2003);
Caterpillar, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No. 8, Letter No. 143 (Nov. 21, 2003); supra note 7
(providing additional examples).
141. See, e.g., AUDITUNG STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 1 14.
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PCAOB articulates generally accepted auditing standards carte blanche,
unchecked by Congressional grants of power. I42 Its actions in developing
Auditing Standard No. 2 show a determination not to be beholden to the
auditing profession. For example, it responded to the auditing
profession's comments by rejecting most of their opinions. It also
imposed substantial duties on auditors, significantly restricted their
discretion, and compelled new disclosure directly from auditors.
These actions suggest an intention to define a new control disclosure
regime in which auditors provide direct and full disclosure unlike what
they have historically provided concerning financial statements. But for
PCAOB's early warning system under Auditing Standard No. 2 to meet
its objectives, it will likely require some legal adjustments such as the use
of safe harbors for forward-looking disclosure, backstopped by
PCAOB's ongoing enhanced auditor oversight role.
3. Auditor Independence
The new control audit regime addresses the tension between
competition and independence in the auditing profession in ways
calculated to improve auditor control disclosure. Competition among
auditing firms has provided the financial reporting system with mixed
results. Critics contend that zealous competition for clients drove
auditors headlong into consulting practices, thereby compromising their
independence.43 More nuanced observers contend that the move to
consulting was a consequence, not a cause, of pressures on auditing firms
arising from governmental policies that encouraged them to compete in
markets other than traditional auditing.'
Whichever view is more accurate, the high-visibility audit failures of
the late 1990s led the SEC to restrict this competition, shutting auditors
out of most consulting markets.'45 SOX elevated these regulatory
restrictions to federal law.' Thus, accompanying the control-disclosure
innovations are regulations intended to reinforce auditor independence.
These include empowering audit committees rather than managers to
142. This is an important feature making it attractive for the SEC to use organizations such as
PCAOB, as well as so-called self-regulatory organizations like the New York Stock Exchange, to assist
the SEC's development and enforcement of corporate governance and related regulations. See Robert
B. Thompson, Collaborative Corporate Governance: Listing Standards, State Law and Federal
Regulation, 38 WAKE FOIST L. REV. 961, 968-69 (2003). The complex interplay between AUDmNG
STANDARD NO. 2 and legal rules under Sections io(b) and ii show the limits of this method of
regulatory production.
143. See, e.g., SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REVISION OF THE COMMISSION'S AUDITOR
INDEPENDENCE REQUIREMENTS (Nov. 2 1, 2000).
I44. See, e.g., Shyam Sunder, Rethinking the Structure of Accounting and Auditing, 7 INDIAN Accr.
REV. 1 (2003), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=4178o4 (last visited July 19, 2004).
145. Amendment of Rule 2-01 of Regulation S-X, 65 Fed. Reg. 76082 (Dec. 5, 2000); see 17 C.F.R..
§ 21 0.2-01 (2004) (qualifications of accountants).
146. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 201, 15 U.S.C. 78j-I (Supp. 2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 21o.2-
01(c) (4 )(i)-(ix).
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hire, supervise, and terminate auditors,'147 as well as restrictions on the
kinds of non-audit services auditors can perform to assure their
independence from management. 4
s
The new model for auditors should now ideally focus not on the
lucrative consulting business, but on providing more effective attestation
services including forward-looking disclosure concerning weaknesses in
control. At stake in this new regime is whether auditors will produce
optimal or sub-optimal information. Risks include auditor biases to err
on the side of treating control irregularities as significant deficiencies
rather than material weaknesses or to provide perfunctory boilerplate
disclosures.
Given Auditing Standard No. 2's limited and somewhat ambiguous
guidance,'49 auditor disclosure will develop by custom and best practices.
Auditors will consider peer disclosure in shaping their own practices.
Disclosure competition among auditors may lead some to provide
disclosure better suited to the tastes of managers (financial statement
preparers) rather than shareholders and the public (financial statement
users). Whether this competition will produce superior or inferior
disclosure depends on whether auditors remain beholden to management
or are independent of them.
Developing a regime of forward-looking disclosure protected by safe
harbor provisions may help realign auditors towards investors and away
from managers.' Auditors may more readily see themselves as partners
with shareholders in warning of control difficulties rather than
adversaries aligned with management in seeking to keep the financial
reporting process opaque. Thus, an early warning system using forward-
looking disclosure and safe harbors can help to reinforce the new regime
of enhanced auditor independence.
III. A DIFFERENT WARNING: CONTROL WORSHIP
The early warning system model is rational. The system attempts to
offer deeper transparency about control when a company's financial
statements fairly present its financial condition and results in conformity
with GAAP but uses weak control. The control weakness may impair the
company's ability to produce reliable financial statements in the future.
In those situations, a warning is appropriate.
147. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, § 301, 15 U.S.C. 78j-i (Supp. 2002).
148. However, not all non-audit services are restricted, and some may be performed with audit
committee pre-approval.
149. See supra Part I.C.
150. This approach is less ambitious than other recent proposals, such as those calling for financial
statement insurance. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers: The Financial Statement
Insurance Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2004), available at
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=554863 (last visited July 19, 2004) (reviewing and assessing various
proposals to realign auditor interests more nearly with investors).
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Consider other possible scenarios: the financials are materially
misstated, but control is effective; or both are uncertifiable (misstated
financials and ineffective control) but the financials are misstated due to
factors other than ineffective control; or both are fine but there is no link
between them. Making transparency meaningful in these contexts
requires greater explanation than Auditing Standard No. 2 requires
auditors to provide. 5'
Auditing Standard No. 2's conceit is that effective control will catch
accidental mistakes, irregularities, and possibly fraud. Auditing Standard
No. 2 correctly emphasizes the inherent limitations of control and the
contrast between reasonable assurance, which is possible, and absolute
assurance, which is not.'52 It likewise notes that the same limits of
financial statement audits apply to control audits.'53 Auditing Standard
No. 2 also rightly describes these limits as known features of the financial
reporting process and expresses the hope that installing safeguards will
"reduce, though not eliminate, the risk" of material financial
misstatements. 5
4
However, Auditing Standard No. 2 never mentions the possibility of
reaching an adverse financial audit opinion despite an unqualified
control audit opinion.'5 Even the most effective internal control cannot
prevent managers from making accounting judgments or estimates that
distort economic and business reality. This will be manifest when an
auditor provides an unqualified opinion on control but an adverse or
qualified opinion on financial statements. When an auditor does so
without explanation, however, financial statement users will be confused.
In effect, Auditing Standard No. 2 and its early warning system assume
that controls are the essence of reliable financial statements.
But consider the variety of circumstances that can lead an auditor to
provide an unqualified opinion on control while providing an adverse or
qualified opinion on financial statements. These involve all matters of
accounting judgment and estimation, ranging from allowance for
doubtful accounts to off-balance sheet financing to stock option
valuation. Any of these and scores of other accounting decisions may be
aggressive. This can be the case even though a company practices air-
tight control over matters such as transaction recording, classification
and aggregation.
151. See supra note 25 (noting that when unqualified opinions are provided, AUDITING STANDARD
NO. 2 requires no special disclosure).
152. AuDITING STANDARD No. 2, supra note 5, app. 1[ 16-18.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1 16.
155. As a matter of logic and probability, it may be more likely that a company will boast
ineffective internal control over financial reporting and yet be in a position to present fair financial
statements than the other way around. But of greater concern is the situation in which effective control
nevertheless yields materially misstated financial statements.
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This class of incongruent opinions can arise for innocuous reasons
such as disagreements over accounting judgments. For example, the
managers and auditors of a company may thoroughly review their
reporting and controls and find both to be airtight, but the SEC disagrees
with an accounting judgment and compels the company to restate its
financials.' s6 There is no weakness or deficiency in control, but there is no
doubt the financial statements were not fairly stated in conformity with
GAAP.
Disagreements concerning accounting judgments can also arise
between management and auditors. Suppose the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) adopts a new accounting standard, and its
interpretation in application is untested. Management may take one
position while the auditor takes another. Although they cannot resolve
the difference, the auditor may not feel constrained to resign from the
engagement. If controls are airtight, the auditor could provide an
unqualified opinion on control but an adverse or qualified opinion on the
financial statements.
Moreover, managerial judgments can simply be out of bounds and
the auditor cannot concur with them. Suppose an auditor assesses
managerial judgments as being too aggressive, whether regarding
doubtful accounts, inventory obsolescence, depreciating fixed assets,
accounting for leases, stock options, derivatives, or any number of other
areas demanding judgment over which control puts no limits. Auditors
can say control is effective, but cannot concur that the financial
statements fairly present the company's financial condition and results in
conformity with GAAP.'57
In many of these contexts, reasonable and prudent investors may see
the incongruent opinions as not merely a yellow flag of caution but a red
flag concerning management's integrity in the financial reporting
process. But not all of these opinions deserve such an interpretation.
Reasonable circumstances may prevent an auditor from giving an
unqualified financial statement opinion while giving an unqualified
opinion on control.
Despite these complex realities, PCAOB and its pronouncements
never mention these situations. Instead, they express ultimate confidence
156. See Comment Letter to PCAOB from BDO Seidman, LLP, PCAOB Rulemaking Docket No.
8, Letter No.136 (2003) (commenting on Proposed Standard, 1 I26: "There are often cases where a
restatement of financial statements is not due to any weakness in internal control (e.g., cases where
accounting or disclosure is responsibly reviewed at all levels of the company and at the highest levels
of the auditing firm, but a restatement is still required due to the insistence of the SEC staff based
upon differing judgment.)").
157. Cf. Comment Letter to PCAOB from Texas Instruments Corporation, PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket No. 8, Letter No. 114 (2003) ("Recent major frauds occurred at management level, so
responding with enhanced testing of computer controls would not have prevented and is wrong
medicine; focus should be on high-risk areas").
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in control as the key to reliable financial reporting. As a result, PCAOB's
new early warning system imposes no explanatory disclosure obligation
on auditors in these situations as it does when controls show material
weakness but financial statements are reliable. This asymmetry can
create an undue emphasis on control and an insufficient emphasis on
matters that must be valued using judgment.
The emphasis on internal control over financial reporting should be
used to promote reliable financial statements; it is not an end in and of
itself. The new deepened transparency concerning control is not what
investors really care about; if auditors had retained investors' trust, it
would not be necessary to deepen disclosure in this way. Investors only
care about control because auditors violated that trust.
Absent auditor or PCAOB explanation of the variety of opinion
combinations and meanings, the new system of yellow (and red) flags will
include no green flags. For example, what is the significance of
unqualified opinions as to both control and financial statements? The
alignment may tend to create a sense in the investment community that
control is working to the end of promoting fair financial statements. But
this impression may be false.' Opposite congruent opinions can likewise
mislead unless they are explained. For joint adverse opinions, the
alignment may signal to investors and others that material weaknesses in
control are to blame for noncompliant financial statements when that
may not be the case.
Without a clear explanation of these incongruities, PCAOB's new
early warning system is only a partial solution. Failure to address these
matters contradicts its premises. Auditing Standard No. 2 reflects a
diminished trust in auditors and an enriched appetite for information
concerning the inner workings of the financial reporting process.
Auditing Standard No. 2 partially succeeds as an early warning system.
But it fails to deliver on its promise by engendering a bewildering variety
of opinion combinations skewed by inflated confidence in the power of
controls to produce reliable financial reporting.'59
The purpose of effective internal control over financial reporting is
to facilitate the preparation of fairly presented financial statements,
current and future. But the possibility of incongruent audit opinions
shows that the two are not always connected. In fact, the possibility of
incongruent opinions suggests a reason to be concerned that control can
158. This raises a curiosity in AUDIING STANDARD No. 2 that would remain a curiosity but for the
planned broad disclosure regime. AUDITING STANDARD No. 2 provides that when management gives its
controls an adverse opinion, and the auditor concurs, it must concur with management (offer an
unqualified opinion on their adverse assessment). See supra note 27.
159 For a broader critique of excessive enthusiasm for internal control in contemporary American
organization culture, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 267 (2004).
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become an end in and of itself rather than the means to the ultimate
objective of fair financial reporting.
CONCLUSION
The interplay between new auditing standards governing audits of
internal control over financial reporting and pre-existing legal standards
governing auditor liability for audit failure produces skewed liability
incentives. If unadjusted, the result threatens to impair the objective of
this new control-audit regime of providing an early warning to financial
statement users when a company's current financial statements are
reliable but control weaknesses indicate that its future statements may
not be. To be meaningful, auditor disclosure of material weaknesses and
potential effects is necessary.
While liability rules under Section ii of the Securities Act of 1933
reinforce auditor incentives to provide this disclosure, liability rules
under Section io(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 discourage
auditors from providing disclosure because doing so likely makes them
primary actors subject to liability rather than secondary actors not
subject to liability. Neutralizing these effects can be achieved by
developing a safe harbor system to protect from Section Io(b) liability
auditor disclosure of forward-looking information necessary to make the
early warning system meaningful.
PCAOB's new early warning system is revolutionary in requiring
auditors to disclose details concerning internal control. Revolutions
invariably bring unintended consequences. Second-order effects are
especially likely for processes with multiple components driven by
numerous actors operating without coordination. For revolution to yield
coherent results, other components must make corresponding
adjustments. The complex United States financial reporting process
illustrates this principle. For PCAOB's revolution in auditing to succeed
in generating optimal disclosure, it needs help from federal securities
law.
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